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ABSTRACT
Geographic Distance and the Impact of Investor Sentiment on Stock Prices
by
YANG Yan
Master of Philosophy
Based on China’s stock market, this study investigates how firms’ geographic distance
from a financial center affects the sensitivity of stock prices to investor sentiment. I
find that firms located closer to a financial center are more affected by investor
sentiment than firms located far from a financial center. This distance effect holds for
different geographic cutting boundaries and after excluding firms located in financial
centers. Besides, using China’s High Speed Railway (HSR) as an exogenous shock, I
find that HSR connection significantly decreases the effect of geographic distance on
the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. In addition, firms with shorter travel
times to financial centers are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with
longer travel times. Moreover, firms located in provinces with a high stock market
participation rate are more affected by investor sentiment than other firms. And
Analysts increase the frequency of favorable recommendations for firms that are
located closer to financial centers when investor sentiment is high. Furthermore, firms
located closer to a financial center do not have higher institutional ownership than
other firms. Last but not least, firms located in more economically developed provinces
are not more affected by investor sentiment than firms located in less developed
provinces. Overall, my findings highlight the importance of geographic distance in
explaining the effects of investor sentiment on stock prices.
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Chapter 1. Introduction

The impact of investor sentiment on stock prices (hereafter the investor sentiment effect)
has received increasing attention from scholars during the past decade. An increasing
number of studies have documented that investor sentiment can affect stock prices, and
periods of high sentiment should be followed by low future stock returns as the price
reverts to its fundamental value (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005; Tetlock, 2007; Seybert and
Yang, 2012; Da et al., 2015). Furthermore, some studies find cross-sectional variations
in the investor sentiment effect, with a stronger effect for firms with greater subjectivity
and that are difficult to value. Specifically, Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007) find that the
investor sentiment effect is stronger for small, young, high-volatility, extreme-growth,
distressed, unprofitable and non-dividend-paying stocks. Firth et al. (2015) argue that low
corporate transparency limits the availability of objective firm-specific information to
investors and consequently forces them to rely more on their subjective judgments in
valuing corporate assets. Consistent with their expectation, they find that firms with low
corporate transparency are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with high
corporate transparency. This study adds to this important emerging literature by
examining whether investor sentiment effects have a geographic component. Specifically,
I examine whether the distance of a firm from financial centers (geographic proximity
hereafter) influences the investor sentiment effect.

The basic motivation of my study comes from the literature demonstrating that the
1

location of firms matters for equity pricing (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Hong et
al., 2008; El Ghoul et al., 2013). For example, Coval and Moskowitz (2001) show that
local investor ownership of a firm is positively related to its future expected returns.
Pirinsky and Wang (2006) find that firms headquartered in the same geographic area
exhibit a strong degree of co-movement in stock returns and argue that the price formation
in stock markets has a significant regional component. Two major explanations have been
proposed to explain the geographic component of stock price formation. The first is the
information perspective, which suggests that information regarding the value of corporate
assets is regionally distributed and stock prices exhibit a regional pattern due to the
incorporation of the regionally distributed information (e.g., Ivković and Weisbenner,
2005; Anand et al., 2011; Kubick and Lockhart, 2016). The second explanation, based on
cognitive bias, suggests that market participants feel more familiar with local firms than
nonlocal firms, and such a divergence in familiarity may induce a regional pattern of stock
prices (e.g., Huberman, 2001; Korniotis and Kumar, 2013).

Building on previous research on investor sentiment and the geographic component of
asset pricing, I investigate whether the location of a firm is also a determinant of the
investor sentiment effect. Specifically, I examine whether the geographic distance of a
firm from its financial center affects the sensitivity of stock prices to market-wide investor
sentiment. I focus on the distance from a financial center because a financial center has a
high concentration of financial institutions (including security firms, investment banks
and mutual funds) and a high density of individual investors, which have important
2

implications for the regional distribution of information (e.g., Loughran and Schultz,
2005; Loughran, 2007). Furthermore, the high concentration of financial market
participants can facilitate social interactions between them, which may help to spread or
intensify their cognitive biases. As I explain shortly, the effect of a firm’s proximity to a
financial center on the investor sentiment effect is theoretically unclear and is therefore
an important and interesting empirical issue for investigation.

Specifically, I propose two competing hypotheses on the impact of geographic proximity
on the investor sentiment effect. The first is the information perspective, which suggests
that market participants tend to have more firm-specific information regarding firms
located near a financial center than distant firms. First, investors can gather more hard
information—information that is quantitative, easy to store and transmit in impersonal
ways, and with content that is independent of the collection process (Petersen, 2004)—
about firms located near a financial center than distant firms because sell-side analysts
work for brokerage firms that are predominantly located near financial centers. As a result,
analysts can issue more research reports on proximate firms than on distant firms. O’Brien
and Tan (2015) offer evidence that analysts are 80% more likely to cover local firms than
nonlocal ones. In addition, Cheng et al. (2016) find that analysts who conduct corporate
site visits can acquire more firm-specific information and thus have greater forecast
accuracy than other analysts. Second, market participants can also obtain more soft
information—information that is difficult to completely summarize in a numeric score
(Petersen, 2004)—on proximate firms than remote firms. For instance, they may directly
3

talk to the managers, suppliers and employees or directly observe the daily operations of
local firms. They may also have personal ties with local firms’ executives. Furthermore,
firms’ investment decisions may be influenced by the local media, of which local market
participants are also more likely to be the audience (Coval and Moskowitz, 1999; El
Ghoul et al., 2013). To the extent that there is more accurate firm-specific soft and hard
information on local firms than nonlocal firms, investors have more reliable information
to draw on when investing in local firms. The availability of information is expected to
reduce investors’ subjectivity in valuing local firms and reduce their reliance on investor
sentiment.

However, previous research documents that investors may tend to invest locally because
they feel more comfortable investing in firms with which they are familiar but do not
necessarily have more information about (the cogntive bias perspective) (e.g., Grinblatt
and Keloharju 2001; Huberman 2001; Seasholes and Zhu 2010). As financial centers have
a high concentration of financial institutions and individual investors and tend to be more
familiar with local than nonlocal firms, firms that are closer to financial centers are more
likely to be affected by familiarity-driven behavior. Furthermore, a high concentration of
market participants also facilitates social interactions, which can facilitate exchanges of
ideas and beliefs (Shiller et al., 1984). Previous research also shows that these social
interactions can have important implications for investor behavior. For example, Hong et
al. (2004) find that social interactions increase stock market participation. Han and
Hirshleifer (2016) model how the bias toward sharing positive information induces more
4

trading. To the extent that market participants are more (less) likely to talk about firms
they are familiar with when investor sentiment is high (low), I expect the perceived
familiarity of local firms to increase (decrease) when investor sentiment is high (low). As
a result, investors are more (less) likely to buy local firms than nonlocal firms when
market sentiment is high (low), resulting in a stronger investor sentiment effect for local
firms than nonlocal firms.

To summarize, the information perspective predicts that the investor sentiment effect is
weaker for local than for nonlocal firms, while the behavior argument proposes that the
investor sentiment effect is stronger for local than for nonlocal firms.

In this study, I aim to distinguish these two competing hypotheses using China’s stock
market as my testing ground. China is the world’s largest emerging market, ranking
second in terms of gross domestic product (GDP)1 and third in terms of geographic area.2
China’s stock market is dominated by individual investors who lack experience with
market downturns (Ng and Wu, 2006), which makes them more prone to optimism. The
opportunities for short-selling and margin trading are very limited in China, which deters
arbitragers from correcting for mispricing (Sharif et al., 2014). The level of corporate
transparency is also low in China, which limits the possibility for investors to conduct
objective evaluations of corporate assets and consequently intensifies the investor
sentiment effect (Firth et al., 2015). As demonstrated by Firth et al. (2015), the investor

1
2

Second to the United States from 2010 and afterwards, according to the IMF.
9,596,961 𝑘𝑚2 , after Russia and Canada.
5

sentiment effect in China tends to be stronger (in terms of magnitude and duration) than
those documented in mature markets. The presence of a significant investor sentiment
effect in China makes it a particularly useful venue for investigating the determinants of
the effect.

China is a vast country with three well-known financial centers in Shanghai, Shenzhen
and Beijing. China’s two stock exchanges are located in Shanghai and Shenzhen. Beijing,
as the Chinese capital, has become the financial services regulatory center of China. It is
also the headquarters of the financial regulatory authorities and the four national banks.
As I show in the next section, these three financial centers in China have a high
concentration of financial institutions and a vast investor base, making them a potential
origin of information and a venue for social interactions.

All initial public offerings (IPOs) in China must be approved by the China Securities
Regulatory Commission (CSRC) (Yang, 2013). The CSRC allocates the security licenses
for firms regarding IPOs and while accounting for regional development; this creates a
network of geographically distributed firms across the country and thus provides huge
variations in geographic distance from firm headquarters to financial centers.

More importantly, the introduction of the High Speed Railway (HSR) in China, the
longest HSR system in the world, provides a valuable testing ground to conduct a
6

portfolio-based difference-in-difference analysis on whether the distance from financial
centers really matters for the investor sentiment effect. The first HSR train was introduced
on April 18, 2007. 3 New lines have gradually been built across the country and the
railway has become immensely popular, with an annual ridership of over 1.44 billion in
2016.4 An HSR connection significantly reduces the travel time required for cross-city
travel and has reduced the effective distance between connected cities and financial
centers. Most importantly, the placement of HSR lines should be based on comprehensive
consideration of the economic development, population and resource distribution,
national security, environmental concerns and social stability of each region, 5 which
have nothing to do with the general market investor sentiment. Furthermore, HSR lines
were introduced in different regions at different times, thus providing the valuable crosssection variations in HSR connections required for a difference-in-difference analysis
(firms connected to HSR and firms unconnected to HSR during our sample period).

My investigation proceeds in two major steps. The first step is to construct the measure
of investor sentiment and validate it. I follow the approach of Baker and Wurgler (2006)
and Firth et al. (2015) in constructing the measure of market-level investor sentiment with
seven variables: closed-end fund discounts, market turnover, the number of IPOs, the IPO
first-day returns, the share of equity issues in new financing, the growth of investment

A trial line with a speed of 200 km/h opened in 2002 between Qinhuangdao and Shenyang and was upgraded to
250 km/h in 2007. According to China’s Rail Safety Management Regulations initiated in 2014, HSR refers to
railway lines running at an average speed of 250 km/h or more, or passenger-dedicated intercity lines running at an
initial speed of 200 km/h or more.
4 China Railway Yearbook 2016.
5 Mid-to-Long Railway Plan, 2008, by the Ministry of Railway in China.
7
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accounts and the growth of savings deposits. While following the same methods to
construct the investor sentiment measures as used by Firth et al. (2015), I extend the
sample period to the end of 2015. I also follow Firth et al. (2015) in validating the investor
sentiment index in China’s stock market and find similar results. Specifically, I find that
the investor sentiment index is negatively related to subsequent market returns from 5
months onward, and this relation becomes significant at 11 months after, which is
consistent with the investor sentiment effect in China’s stock market.

I then compute the geographic distance between the headquarters of a firm and its relevant
financial center. As mentioned, there are three financial centers in China— Shanghai,
Shenzhen and Beijing. Specifically, firms that are headquartered within a certain radius
of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are considered as local firms, whereas firms that are
headquartered outside the radius are considered nonlocal firms. Following previous
studies (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001; Ivković and Weisbenner, 2005; Kang and
Kim, 2008; Seasholes and Zhu, 2010), I consider radiuses of 250 miles, 100 miles and
100 kilometers. To better investigate the difference in the investor sentiment effect
between local and nonlocal firms, I also compare the effect on firms located within a
radius of 100 kilometers and firms outside a radius of 1,000 kilometers. As the investor
sentiment effect becomes significant at 11 months and after, I focus on the horizons of 9,
12 and 15 months.

The second step is to conduct a regression analysis to discern the investor sentiment
8

effects. My investigation period ranges from January 2003 to December 2015 due to the
lack of monthly trading accounts data before 2003. My investor sentiment composite
index consists of 156 monthly observations, and the initial sample contains all
nonfinancial firms listed on either the Shanghai or Shenzhen A-share stock exchanges. To
examine the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices, I follow previous research in
regressing future cumulative returns on sentiment and include control variables for each
set of portfolios sorted by local versus nonlocal firms. I find consistent and significant
evidence that local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal firms,
regardless of the criteria used to classify them as local versus nonlocal. The result is
consistent with the cognitive bias perspective. This distance effect still holds after I
eliminate firms headquartered right in the financial centers, suggesting that the results are
driven not by financial centers but by the important role that geographic distance plays in
the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. Furthermore, using China’s HSR as an
exogenous shock, I find that the impact of investor sentiment on stock prices varies not
only between local and nonlocal firms, but also in terms of HSR connection. Specifically,
I divide firms into HSR-connected and HSR-unconnected groups. The distance effect
holds in the circumstance that nonlocal firms stay unconnected to HSR during the sample
period. In contrast, I observe the distance effect for the HSR-connected group before the
connection, but it disappears once the HSR is in operation, which provides direct evidence
that upgrading the transport infrastructure can mitigate the impact of geographic distance
on the investor sentiment effect. Moreover, in order to mitigate the effect of aviation, I
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restrict firms located within a radius of 1500 kilometers6 and conduct the difference-indifference analysis again to clarify the effect of HSR lines. The results are still holds.
Furthermore, I divide firms into local and nonlocal firms according to the travel times
(including railway, airline and toll road) and find that firms with less travel times to a
financial center are more affected by investor sentiment than their counterparts,
suggesting that the time cost of inter-city travel is an important consideration for financial
market participants.

In addition, I try to seek additional evidence for the distance effect. First, I provide
evidence that investor concentration matters for the distance effect. I find that among
firms headquartered in the province, the three top-ranking firms in terms of stock market
participation are more affected by investor sentiment than the other firms, which supports
the notion that the concentration of individual investors matters for the investor sentiment
effect.

Second, a huge strand of the literature documents that sell-side analysts show an
optimistic bias in their earnings forecasts or stock recommendations and attribute it to
their strategic behavior or cognitive bias (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998;
Qian, 2009; Firth et al., 2013). Moreover, investor sentiment may affect analysts. Bagnoli
et al. (2009) show that analysts pay attention to investor sentiment when issuing stock
recommendations. Hribar and McInnis (2012) find that analysts’ earnings forecasts are

6“We

believe HSR is not so competitive for distances over 1,500 kilometers” from Morgan Stanley Report “China
High-Speed Rail” May 15, 2011.
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more optimistic during periods with high market-wide sentiment. Corredor et al.
(2014) confirm the cognitive bias in analyst forecasts with the finding that investor
sentiment is positively and significantly related to analyst forecast errors in European
markets. Consistent with this strand of literature, I find that analysts cover more local than
nonlocal firms given the convenience of time and transportation costs. When investor
sentiment is high, analysts issue more “Strong buy” or “Buy” recommendations. On
average, local firms have 37 more “Strong buy” recommendations and 24 more “Buy”
recommendations than nonlocal firms each quarter. Most importantly, analysts increase
the frequency of favorable recommendations for local firms when investor sentiment is
high. The results suggest that financial analysts tend to be more optimistic about local
firms than nonlocal firms when investor sentiment is high, which may also drive the
documented distance effect.

Furthermore, I provide evidence that there exists no difference between local and nonlocal
firms in terms of institutional ownership, which helps to rule out the possibility that the
geographic component in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship is induced by
institutional investors and it further supports the notion that the geographically-distributed
retail investors who are relatively inexperienced and more prone to market sentiment than
institutional investors drive our main result.

Last but not least, I also offer evidence that the relation between geographic distance and
the investor sentiment effect is not driven by strong economic performance and a good
11

market environment. Specifically, there is no significant difference in the investor
sentiment effect between firms headquartered in provinces with high GDP and firms
located in other provinces, even after excluding firms located right in the financial center.

These results address the endogeneity concern and support the notion that a geographic
component exists in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship.

My studies contribute to the literature on the investor sentiment effect by adding an
important geographic component. Unlike studies that focus on firm fundamental and
corporate transparency in driving the sentiment effect, my study offers evidence that
geographic distance from a firm’s headquarters to its financial center can help to explain
the sensitivity of stock prices to investor sentiment. Studies of the investor sentiment
effect tend to construct a market-wide sentiment index for a stock market or a country.
The geographic difference in the investor sentiment effect documented here raises the
question of whether a regionally based sentiment index may be more relevant for
investigating this effect in a large country such as China. This is an important issue for
further research.

My study also contributes to the literature on the role of geographic distance in financial
markets in two ways. First, studies have predominantly focused on mature markets such
as those in the U.S. and other developed countries (e.g., Grinblatt and Keloharju, 2001;
Butler, 2008; Almazan et al., 2010; John et al., 2011). Fewer studies have been conducted
12

on emerging markets where the development of financial markets (such as corporate
governance, the information environment, investor protection, and education) and the
investor base (with predominantly inexperienced retail investors), are vastly different
from those of developed markets (Lemmon and Lins, 2003; Leuz et al., 2003). I focus on
the world’s largest emerging market and obtain evidence that is consistent with the salient
characteristics of emerging markets. Second, my study also adds to the line of studies
attempting to identify and distinguish the mechanisms underlying the geographic patterns
of stock prices (e.g., Coval and Moskowitz, 2001; Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Anand et al.,
2011). By focusing on whether geographic proximity mitigates or intensifies investor
sentiment effects, my study offers new evidence that the geographic pattern is driven by
cognitive bias rather than information.

In addition to academic value, my study has policy implications and practical relevance
for investors. Regarding the policy implications, for a large country such as China, the
issue of whether to have just a few large financial centers or a network of decentralized
financial centers has been intensively debated. My findings show that the existence of
several large financial centers with a high concentration of financial institutions and
investors may fuel the investor sentiment effect, especially in the context of an emerging
market. They also show that investment in transportation infrastructure can help to reduce
the effective distance and mitigate the investor sentiment effect.

Regarding practical relevance, my findings suggest that investors can make use of the
13

geographical component in investor sentiment effect to formulate their investment
decisions. For example, investors can ride the sentiment effect by tilting their portfolios
toward local stocks in the early stage of the high investor sentiment period and short-sell
them in the later stage.

14

Chapter 2. Research background

Studies have documented that investor sentiment affects stock returns, although classical
financial theory argues that rational arbitrageurs could bet against the risk of noise traders
and correct for the mispricing they induce (e.g., Fama, 1965; Black,1986; Brown and
Cliff, 2005). A branch of the literature also offers evidence that the location of firms plays
an important role in stock pricing (e.g., Anand et al., 2011; Garcia and Norli, 2012). While
a firm’s fundamentals and corporate transparency could explain the sensitivity of stock
prices to investor sentiment (e.g., Baker and Wurlger, 2006; Firth et al., 2014), little
attention has been paid to the location of the firm in the sentiment-driven stock price
relationship. In this study, I investigate the influence of geographic distance on the
sentiment-driven stock price relationship.

2.1. Investor sentiment and asset valuation

Investor sentiment, also known as “noise trader sentiment,” “the propensity of speculation”
or “the optimism or pessimism about the overall stock market,” refers to the unpredictable
opinions of noise traders about asset returns that are not warranted by fundamentals (De
Long et al., 1990, hereafter DSSW; Baker and Wurgler, 2006). Classical financial theories
argue that noise traders who make destabilizing speculations always lose money to
rational arbitrageurs and will finally disappear from the financial market (Friedman 1953).
However, DSSW (1990) refute that noise traders’ beliefs may not revert to their mean
15

over a longer period and may become more extreme in the meantime, and hence that
rational arbitrageurs lose money by trading against noise traders. As risk-averse
arbitrageurs have reasonably short horizons, their willingness to arbitrage is limited.
DSSW (1990) further argue that the unpredictability in noise traders’ opinions of future
stock prices deter arbitrage and affect prices even when there is no fundamental risk.

A large strand of the literature documents that investor sentiment can affect stock prices.
Lee et al. (1991) suggest that the fluctuations in closed-end fund discounts are driven by
changes in investor sentiment because the optimism or pessimism of individual investors
affects the prices of underlying securities. Barberis et al. (1998 ) model investor sentiment
and point out that conservatism and the representative heuristic make investors underreact
and overreact to news, respectively. Using the number of “bullish,” “bearish” or “neutral”
newsletters to measure investor sentiment, Brown and Cliff (2005) provide evidence that
investor sentiment drives stock prices to deviate from their fundamental values. When
beginning-of-period investor sentiment is high, future stock returns are low as the stock
price reverts to its fundamental value and vice versa. This investor sentiment effect
changes according to the subjectivity of the valuation, limits on arbitrage, short-sale
constraints and corporate information environment. Baker and Wurgler (2006, 2007)
construct a market-level investor sentiment index and offer systematic evidence that
investor sentiment can affect the cross-section of stock returns. Specifically, they suggest
that stocks that are hard to value and difficult to arbitrage are more vulnerable to investor
sentiment, and empirically document that small, young, high-volatility, unprofitable, non16

dividend-paying, extreme-growth and distressed stocks are affected more by investor
sentiment. Stambaugh et al. (2012) suggest that the short-sale constraints contribute to
overpricing when market-wide sentiment is high by exploring 11 asset pricing anomalies.
Firth et al. (2015) demonstrate that firms with higher corporate transparency, measured
by a bunch of variables including state ownership, the prevalence of related party
transactions, accrual-based earnings management, audit opinions and the quality of audit
firms are less affected by investor sentiment than firms with low corporate transparency.
Cornell et al. (2014) further argue that high-quality accounting information reduces
sentiment-related mispricing.

More recent studies seek new ways to measure investor sentiment. For example, Arif and
Lee (2014) argue that aggregate corporate investment is an alternative measure of marketlevel investor sentiment. Da et al. (2015) suggest that households’ daily Internet search
volume can reveal market level investor sentiment. Aboody et al. (2016) offer empirical
evidence that overnight stock returns have the same characteristics as the existing
sentiment measure and propose that they could measure firm-specific investor sentiment.
I follow the approach of Baker and Wurlger (2006) in constructing the market-level
investor sentiment index for two reasons. First, the sentiment index produced by Baker
and Wurgler is the most widely used to date (e.g., McLean and Zhao, 2014; Antoniou et
al., 2015). Second, Firth et al. (2015) have already validated the index in the Chinese
stock market by extending Baker and Wurlger’s (2006) approach.

17

2.2. Firm location and asset pricing

The location of a firm matters for equity pricing. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) establish
a geographic link between a fund investment and its performance. They find that fund
managers earn substantial abnormal returns in their proximate investments and show that
local investor ownership of a firm is positively related to its future expected returns after
controlling for other factors that are known to capture a sizable portion of the crosssectional variation in stock returns. Pirinsky and Wang (2006) document a strong comovement in the stock returns of firms located in the same geographic area and argue that
the price formation of the stock market has an important geographic component that is
linked to the trading patterns of local residents. Hong et al. (2008) relate the stock price
of a firm to the market conditions of its home locale by suggesting that the ratio of the
aggregate book value of all firms headquartered in a certain region to the aggregate
income of all households in the region has a negative effect on stock prices. Baik et al.
(2010) find that both the level of and change in local institutional ownership predict future
stock returns, and stocks in the local institutional investors’ portfolio can earn higher
excess returns around future earnings announcements than their counterparts. Anand et
al. (2011) explore the importance of geographic proximity between firms and market
makers for price discovery in the NASDAQ stock market and find that geographically
proximate market makers contribute more to the price discovery of a firm’s stock than
distant market makers. Garcia and Norli (2012) show that firms with business activities
concentrated in a small geographic area have higher returns than geographically dispersed
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firms. El Ghoul et al. (2013) provide robust evidence that firms located in nonfinancial
centers exhibit a higher cost of equity capital than firms headquartered in financial centers.
Kubick and Lockhart (2016) find that a firm’s proximity to a Securities Exchange
Commission office influences the individual stock price crash risk. Overall, this branch
of the literature highlights the importance of geography in asset pricing.

2.3. Geographic distance and information asymmetry

Another large strand of the literature demonstrates that geographic proximity helps to
exploit local knowledge and gather information. As a result, being close can lower the
level of information asymmetry between economic agents who possess a different
information set. Coval and Moskowitz (2001) suggest that fund managers can earn
abnormal returns on their geographically proximate investments with the help of their
local information advantage. Ivković and Weisbenner (2005) argue that individual
investors may find it easier to gather accurate value-relevant information on firms located
close to them than on remote firms, and differentiate the “asymmetric information
hypothesis” from the “familiarity hypothesis” by empirically documenting that proximate
investments with value-relevant information can realize superior returns. Malloy
(2005) finds that geographically proximate analysts are more accurate than other analysts
because of their information advantage. Butler (2008) investigates municipal bond
offerings and also finds that the comparative advantage of local investment banks is the
most prominent for the most opaque issuers, which suggests that local underwriters have
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easy access to specific information about issuers and thus can better evaluate them. Kang
and Kim (2008) demonstrate that block acquirers who enjoy an information advantage
(e.g., lower monitoring and time costs; more private and valuable information in terms of
local targets) can perform better during the post-acquisition period. Baik et al.
(2010) offer empirical evidence that the ownership of institutional investors can only
predict future stock returns for local firms, and further highlight the informational
advantages of local institutional investors. Bernile et al. (2015) suggest that geographical
variation in firms’ economic activities generates location-based information asymmetry
among investors, which in turn influences their portfolio decisions and performance.
Overall, these findings confirm that geographic distance may measure the level of
information asymmetry by showing that economic agents can obtain more accurate
information as distance erodes.

2.4. Geographic distance, familiarity and social interaction

The basic assumption behind the asymmetric information hypothesis 7 is that the
information disseminated near proximate regions is accurate and authentic. However,
geographic proximity also exposes stocks to a wide variety of individual and institutional
characteristics in certain regions at the same time. Specifically, physical proximity also
facilitates social interactions and the transmission of sentiment and non-market
information (Pirinsky and Wang, 2010). Another growing area of the literature suggests

7

The hypothesis that geographic distance could measure the level of information asymmetry.
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that investors’ preference for local investments is driven by a behavioral bias that makes
them feel more comfortable investing in firms with which they are familiar. Based on a
series of behavioral experiments, Heath and Tversky (1991) suggest that people prefer to
bet on their own judgment in a context where they feel competent, and that this feeling is
enhanced by familiarity and experience. They further argue that the reason investors with
knowledge of diversification concentrate on a small number of firms is that investors
regard themselves as capable of judging local investments. Using a Finnish dataset,
Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) empirically document that a firm’s distance, language and
culture are three important factors for investors’ local preference because these factors
enhance familiarity. Huberman (2001) also suggests that familiarity represents investors’
belief that they currently have superior information or will obtain more information, and
this familiarity drives their local investments. Seasholes and Zhu (2010) offer systematic
empirical evidence that local investments do not generate abnormal returns and conclude
that local preference is not driven by an information advantage. Korniotis and Kumar
(2013) use a novel demographic-based proxy for smartness and find that “smart”
investors have an information advantage while “dumb” investors reflect a psychological
bias, such as overconfidence and sensation seeking, in their local investments.

In addition, geographic proximity may promote social interactions, and the actions of a
reference group can affect an individual’s preference (Horst and Scheinkman, 2006).
Shiller (1984) suggests that investors’ behavior is socially influenced and argue that
fluctuations in attitude often occur in the population and often without any apparent
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logical reason. Hong et al. (2004) find that households that interact with their neighbors
or attend church are substantially more likely to participate in the stock market than other
households. They also document that a fund manager is more likely to hold a specific
stock if other managers in the same city invest in this firm and point out that investors
spread stock market information by word of mouth (Hong et al., 2005). Brown et al.
(2008) also suggest that an individual’s investment decisions on stocks are affected by
their neighbors via word-of-mouth. Baker et al. (2012) argue that social interaction is a
mechanism used to spread sentiment. Han and Hirshleifer (2016) model how the bias
toward sharing positive information induces more trading. These social interactions
between financial market participants may increase the degree of familiarity and boost
rumors, especially for unsophisticated individual investors who reveal cognitive bias.

2.5. Investor sentiment and sell-side analysts

Sell-side analysts play an important role in financial markets. They are in charge of
synthesizing and disseminating information in capital markets, and investors with limited
time or ability to analyze financial data often rely on analysts’ work (Bradshaw, 2011).
However, analysts show an optimistic bias in earnings forecasts and stock
recommendations (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and McNichols, 1998; Qian, 2009; Firth et al.,
2013), even though an analyst is more likely to turn over if his or her forecast accuracy is
lower than that of his or her peers (Mikhail et al.,1999). Strategic behavior or cognitive
bias contributes to this optimistic bias. For strategic behavior, Lim (2001) argues that
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analysts trade off positive bias to improve management access and forecast accuracy
because unfavorable forecasts limit or eliminate analysts’ access to insiders. Hong and
Kubik (2003) document that analysts who issue relatively optimistic forecasts are more
likely to get favorable job separation, namely, moving upward in the hierarchy of
brokerage firms because optimistic forecasts generate more trading and thus higher
compensation for those analysts. In addition, Friesen and Weller (2006) model cognitive
bias in analysts’ earnings forecasts and find both US and international evidence that
analysts are overconfident about the precision of their own information and suffer from
cognitive dissonance bias. Mokoaleli et al. (2009) also suggest that the new buy stock
recommendations reflect both behavioral bias and conflicts of interest in analysts.

In addition, analysts are affected by investor sentiment when they issue earnings forecasts
and stock recommendations. Bagnoli et al. (2009) argue that analysts, who know that
investor sentiment can affect stock prices, may consider both firm fundamentals and
investor sentiment when making their recommendations. They provide empirical
evidence that analysts pay attention to investor sentiment when issuing stock
recommendations, and those that are positively correlated with investor sentiment tend to
be less profitable. Hribar and McInnis (2012) suggest that analysts’ earnings forecasts are
a direct measure of investors’ earnings expectations and offer evidence that their forecasts
are more optimistic during periods with high market-wide investor sentiment for
uncertain and hard-to-value firms. Corredor et al. (2014) confirm that both cognitive bias
and strategic behavior exist in analyst forecasts and find that investor sentiment is
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positively and significantly related to analyst forecast errors in European markets.

2.6. Institutional background and geographic distribution in China

China became the world’s second largest economy in terms of GDP in 2011 with
persistent economic growth over the past 30 years. In addition, the Chinese stock market
has grown exponentially to become the second largest in the world (after the United
States).8 China has the third largest geographic area in the world, with three financial
centers: Shanghai, Shenzhen and Beijing.

Shanghai’s role as a predominant financial hub in the Asia Pacific region dates back to
the 1930s. The first stock exchange market in China, the Shanghai Stock Exchange, was
established in 1990 and has grown rapidly in the past decade. The Shanghai Stock
Exchange provides a platform to raise capital for firms and offers investment
opportunities for individuals. Shanghai also has a large urban economy and is a center for
manufacturing and commerce.

In addition, the Lujiazui Financial District9 and Shanghai Free Trade Zone10 offer strong
policy-supported advantages for financial market development in Shanghai, and

As of March 2017, the total market value of the Shanghai and Shenzhen exchanges was US$7830.9 billion.
The state council declared the opening of Lujiazui district in 1990; financial firms in this district enjoy special tax
policies, incentives and support, including personnel training and expedited visa services.
10 The state council launched the Shanghai Free Trade Zone in 2013. The zone cancels out a number of financial
requirements for setting up a company in China and also introduces a simplified procedure for foreign investors to
establish a company.
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consequently, 445 multinational corporation (MNCs) had established regional
headquarters there by 2013. Moreover, in the same year, Shanghai ranked first with
respect to the total number of listed companies, listed H-shares companies, fund
companies’ headquarters, security companies’ headquarters, total stock turnover value
and so forth (Zhao et al., 2013).

Shenzhen is positioned as a regional financial center according to “The Outline of the
Plan for the Reform and Development of the Pearl River Delta” announced by the
National Development and Reform Commission. The geographic proximity to Hong
Kong provides Shenzhen with a good foundation of specialized manufacturing and
finance. The small and medium enterprise (SME) board and the ChiNext 11 on the
Shenzhen Stock Exchange (SZSE) give small but high-growth and high-tech companies
opportunities to raise capital. The ChiNext board has become the world’s third largest
market for growth enterprises and the largest among similar boards in Asia in terms of
market capitalization and trade value (Zhao et al., 2013). Shenzhen also has a lot of
investment and management companies, private equity and venture capital funds, which
suits the needs of growing companies. Moreover, preferential government policies,
including the establishment of Special Economic Zones and the Shenzhen-Hong Kong
Modern Service Industry Cooperation Zone in Qianhai, have attracted foreign direct
investment to start businesses and set up headquarters in Shenzhen.

11

China’s NASDAQ-style stock market.
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Beijing is considered a financial center in China, although it does not have a stock
exchange. A financial street was established by the State Council according to the 1993
Master Plan, and it was designed to host all regulatory agencies, including the central
bank, the China Banking Regulatory Commission, the China Insurance Regulatory
Commission and the China Securities Regulatory Commission, and headquarters of the
big four state banks and non-banking enterprises (Chen and Chen, 2015). These financial
regulatory organizations helped Beijing to become an information hinterland of financial
policy and consequently attracted firms to become established there. Beijing’s total Ashare market capitalization ranked first in China and there are many large state-owned
enterprises headquartered in Beijing. Beijing possesses the largest amount of A-shareraised capital and the second largest number of listed companies and trading value in
China (Zhao et al., 2013). Moreover, Beijing is quite strong in the bond market, banking
industry, PE fund market and insurance market and thus is an ideal place for MNC
headquarters.

Overall, these three financial centers in China have a high concentration of financial
institutions and a vast investor base, making them a potential origin of information and a
venue for social interactions.
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Chapter 3. Hypothesis Development and Empirical Results

3.1. Proximity and sentiment effect: more information or more behavioral bias?

Baker and Wurgler (2006) argue that firms that are more difficult to value are more
affected by investor sentiment. In line with this view, Firth et al. (2015) find that firms
with low corporate transparency are more vulnerable to market sentiment than their
counterparts. Considering that the location of a firm influences equity pricing (e.g.,
Pirinsky and Wang, 2006; Garcia and Norli, 2012), it is plausible that a firm’s proximity
to a financial center might also affect its valuation difficulty and thus influence the
sentiment-driven stock price relation. Money managers, major brokerage firms and
thousands of investors are sited predominately near urban metropolitan areas (Loughran,
2007 ), especially in or near financial centers. Thus, a firm might be exposed to the
general informational context or investors’ characteristics in or near the financial center.

As discussed in the introduction, there are two competing hypotheses with regard to the
impact of geographic distance on the investor sentiment effect. The first is the information
hypothesis. Investors may obtain more value-relevant and firm-specific information on
local firms than nonlocal firms. For a start, investors can easily access hard information
on local firms. For instance, analysts who work for brokerage firms are more likely to
cover local firms as the time and travel costs are low. O’Brien and Tan (2015 ) suggest
that analysts are 80% more likely to cover IPO firms headquartered in their home states
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than those in other states after controlling for industry specialization and underwriter
status. Consequently, local firms are likely to have more frequent analyst forecasts,
recommendations and reports than nonlocal ones. In addition, analysts who conduct
corporate site visits can gather more firm-specific information and have greater forecast
accuracy than other analysts (Cheng et al., 2016), which supports the notion that local
firms have more hard information than do nonlocal firms. Furthermore, proximity offers
an ideal channel for the collection of soft information. Agarwal and Hauswald (2010 )
find that borrower proximity facilitates the collection of soft information and the firmbank distance drives a trade-off in the availability and pricing of credit. In a similar vein,
John et al. (2011) argue that a firm’s distance from shareholders limits the observability
of managerial investment decisions, thereby exacerbating agency costs and strengthening
the need for dividend payouts in the presence of free cash flow. If geographic proximity
facilitates the diffusion of firm-specific information (including both hard and soft
information), firms with greater proximity to a financial center should face a lower level
of information asymmetry. With less valuation difficulty and more information to rely on,
external investors have lower monitoring and information-gathering costs for local than
nonlocal firms. As a result, investors depend less on their subjective judgment when
investing in local firms, which are then less affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal
firms.

The second hypothesis is based on the cognitive bias perspective. First, investors have a
preference for firms they are familiar with. Huberman (2001) finds that clients of the
28

Regional Bell Operating Companies are much more likely to own stocks in the telephone
company that provides their service than another telephone company, and argue that
people prefer investing in the familiar. Grinblatt and Keloharju (2001) document that
investors are more likely to hold, buy and sell the stocks of firms that are located close to
them, communicate in their native tongue or have chief executives of the same cultural
background. In addition, investors with limited cognitive ability may rely on familiarity
as a screening device and therefore overweight familiar local stocks (Bernile et al., 2015).
Huberman and Regev (2001) find that optimistic public attention induces a rise in the
stock price of a biotechnology company even though no new information has been
presented. Barber and Odean (2008) provide strong evidence that investors with scarce
attention are net buyers of attention-grabbing stocks, including stocks that are in the news,
are experiencing higher abnormal trading volume or have extreme one-day returns. I
argue that investors who have limited attention may choose to invest in the familiar.
Moreover, Seasholes and Zhu (2010) offer systematic empirical evidence that local
portfolios do not generate abnormal returns, and purchases of local stocks significantly
underperform sales of local stocks, suggesting that investors do not have value-relevant
information about local stocks.

Financial centers have a high concentration of market participants, who are more familiar
with nearby firms than those located far away. As a result, local firms are expected to be
more affected by the cognitive bias of familiarity than nonlocal firms. Furthermore, I
expect the familiarity effect to be stronger (weaker) during a period of high investor
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sentiment. Because market participants are more (less) likely to talk about firms for
investment when market sentiment is high (low) and such social interactions may affect
the behavior of the market participants. For example, financial analysts may be more (less)
willing to cover local firms when investor sentiment is high (low) and individual investors
are more (less) likely to buy local firms when investor sentiment is high (low). As
documented by Hong et al. (2004), social interactions can boost stock market
participation. Consequently, local firms may be more affected by investor sentiment than
nonlocal firms.

The influence of geographic proximity on the investor sentiment effect is therefore
theoretically uncertain. Given that the information environment in China is poor and that
various market participants (financial analysts and investors) are relatively inexperienced,
I nevertheless formulate a hypothesis in favor of the cognitive bias perspective for
empirical testing. The hypothesis is formally stated as follows.

All else being equal, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal
firms.

3.2. Construction and validation of an investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock
market

I construct an investor sentiment index to examine the sentiment effect in the Chinese
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stock market. Baker and Wurgler (2006) develop an investor sentiment index using
principal component analysis based on six underlying proxies for sentiment: closed-end
fund discounts, market turnover, the number of IPOs, the average first-day returns on
IPOs, the equity share of new issues and the dividend premium. Based on Baker and
Wurgler’s (2006) work, Firth et al. (2015) form a component sentiment index in the
Chinese stock market by considering another two underlying proxies for investor
sentiment: the deposit savings growth rate and the number of new investment accounts.
For the deposit savings growth rate, Firth et al. (2015) point out that Chinese investors
allocate their money mainly between banks and equity markets because of the
underdeveloped nature of financial markets and capital control in China. When investors
become disappointed with the stock market, they aggressively switch their investments
in equities to their traditional concentration in savings accounts. Burdekin and Redfern
(2009) find that the rising stock market sentiment exerted a significant negative effect on
time deposit growth in China during 2003-2007, which supports the argument of Firth et
al. (2015). For the number of new investments accounts, they suggest that China’s stock
market has a relatively short history compared with the developed financial markets, and
that net inflows of new investors have entered the Chinese stock market in the last few
decades. Due to their lack of investment experience and suffering during market
downturns, investors may rely heavily on market sentiment rather than the rational
calculation of firm fundamentals to participate in the stock market, especially in bull
periods. Therefore, Firth et al. (2015) argue that the number of new investment accounts
in the stock market may serve as a potential proxy for investor sentiment. In this paper, I
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follow the approach used by both Baker and Wurlger (2006) and Firth et al. (2015) and
construct a monthly investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock market from January
2003 to December 2015.

3.2.1. Construction of the investor sentiment index in the Chinese stock market

Following Firth et al. (2015), I construct an investor sentiment index based on the
variations of seven underlying proxies: the closed-end fund discount (CEFD), market
turnover (TURN), the number of IPOs (NIPO) and their average first-day return (RIPO),
the proportion of equity issues in the total issue of equity and long-term debt (Eshare),
the deposit savings growth rate (DSG) and the number of new investment accounts
(NACT). The first five variables are constructed in the same way as described by Baker
and Wurlger (2006). Specifically, CEFD refers to the value-weighted average difference
between the net asset value (NAV) per share and market price of each closed-end fund
share, divided by the net asset value (NAV) per share. TURN is constructed as the natural
log of the ratio of the amount of monthly market turnover trading to the aggregate market
value, detrended by the 5-month moving average. NIPO is the number of IPOs and RIPO
refers to the market-adjusted first-day returns. Eshare is the proportion of new equity
issuance to total capital (total equity issuances plus bank borrowing) raised in a year. DSG
is defined as the residual from the regression of the growth rate of seasonally adjusted
deposit savings on the growth rate of M0. NACT is defined as the natural log of the
number of new investment accounts.
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Following Baker and Wurlger (2006), I isolate the common component in the
aforementioned seven proxies using principal component analysis, considering that each
proxy is likely to include a sentiment-based and an idiosyncratic or non-sentiment-related
component. As some proxies may take longer to reveal the same sentiment, I perform a
factor analysis on all of the variables and their lags to determine the best lead-lag structure
for each proxy. First, I estimate the first principal component of the seven proxies and
their lags. This procedure produces a first-stage index with 14 loadings, one for each of
the current and lagged proxies. I then calculate the correlation between the first-stage
index and the current and lagged values of each proxy. Finally, I construct the sentiment
index as the first principal component based on the correlation matrix of the seven proxies;
I use the current or lagged value of the seven proxies, depending on which has a higher
correlation with the first-stage index. I standardize the second-stage sentiment index so
that the index has unit variance. The first principal component explains 37.37% of the
sample variance, which is comparable with the explanatory power of the sentiment index
reported in major developed countries (Baker et al., 2012). The correlation of the firstand second-stage indexes is 0.96, suggesting that little information is lost in dropping the
seven proxies with other time scripts. The sentiment index is constructed as follows:
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡 = −0.1207𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡 + 0.5317𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1 + 0.3607𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡 +
0.1895𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡−1 + 0.4217𝐸𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡 − 0.2844𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑡−1 + 0.5272𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡−1

(1)

As the variations of some proxies may have both a sentiment component and a business
cycle component, I then construct a second index that explicitly removes the business
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cycle variation from each of the proxies before the principal component analysis.
Following Firth et al. (2015), I regress each of the seven raw proxies on the industrial
production and consumption growth rates. The residuals labeled with a superscript ⊥
from these regressions are cleaner proxies for investor sentiment, and I construct the
sentiment index following the same procedures as before. The corresponding first
principal component explains 36.87% of the sample variance, which is still comparable
with the explanatory powers of the sentiment index reported in major developed countries
(Baker et al., 2012). The final investor sentiment index is constructed as follows:
⊥
𝑠𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑡⊥ = −0.0702𝐶𝐸𝐹𝐷𝑡⊥ + 0.5174𝑇𝑈𝑅𝑁𝑡−1
+ 0.3134𝑁𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡⊥ +
⊥
⊥
⊥
0.2115𝑅𝐼𝑃𝑂𝑡−1
+ 0.4482𝐸𝑠ℎ𝑎𝑟𝑒𝑡⊥ − 0.3352𝐷𝑆𝐺𝑡−1
+ 0.5207𝑁𝐴𝐶𝑇𝑡−1

(2)

Similar to the results of Firth et al. (2015), NACT has the highest loadings in the sentiment
index and the factor loading on DSG is higher than those on CEFD, NIPO and RIPO,
which indicates that both proxies are important for constructing an investor sentiment
index in the Chinese stock market. Table 1 presents the summary statistics and
correlations between the components of the sentiment index. All of the components are
significantly correlated in the expected directions. When investor sentiment is high, the
market trading volume moves up, the number of IPOs and the average first-day return of
IPOs increase, the proportion of new equity issuances to total capital goes up and the
number of new investment accounts soars, whereas the money-supply-adjusted deposit
savings and the closed-end fund discount decrease. NACT and TURN are significantly
correlated with every other component, consistent with the notion that NACT and TURN
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make the largest contribution to the investor sentiment index. The correlations between
the orthogonal variables only change slightly.

3.2.2 Validation of the investor sentiment index in Chinese stock market

To validate the investor sentiment index, I apply the same approach as Firth et al. (2015).
Specifically, the general sentiment effect implies that if excessively optimistic sentiment
drives the stock price up from its fundamental value, periods of high sentiment should be
followed by low future stock returns as the stock price reverts back to its fundamental
value. To investigate the sentiment effect, I regress the future excess market returns
(𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 ) on the sentiment index SENT and hypothesize that the coefficients of the
sentiment index should be significantly negative. I compute 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 as the valueweighted market returns minus the risk-free rate12 and cumulate it over various horizons
from 1 to 24 months. Following the asset pricing literature (e.g., Brown and Cliff, 2005;
Lemmon and Portniaguina, 2006), I use macroeconomic variables as controls, namely,
the contemporaneous market return (𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 ), aggregate earnings-to-price ratio (𝐸𝑃𝑡 ),
monthly interest rate (𝑅𝐹𝑡 ) and inflation rate (𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 ). However, the investor sentiment
index I construct is predetermined13 and not strictly exogenous,14 and the estimation on
the lagged endogenous variables from the ordinary least squares regression is biased in
finite samples (Stambaugh, 1999). In addition, the residuals from the regressions with

Measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits.
The past market sentiment affects current investor behavior but has little impact on future investor sentiment. For
instance, a past financial crisis will lower the intention to invest in stock market now, but future financial growth or a
hot market in the near future will not affect market-wide investor sentiment.
14 The seven proxies for investor sentiment have an impact on stock returns.
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overlapping observations can be serially correlated up to lag K-1 under both the null and
alternative hypotheses, which fully account for time-varying expected returns
(Swaminathan, 1996). To cope with these problems, I follow the approach of Nelson and
Kim (1993) and Neal and Wheatley (1998) in testing significance by comparing the test
statistics with their empirical distributions computed from randomization simulations.
The regression model is as follows:
∑𝐾
𝑘=1[𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 /𝐾] = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘
(3)

where SENT refers to the investor sentiment index and 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇 refers to the equalweighted market return over the risk-free rate. The summary statistics of SENT and other
control variables are shown in Panel C of Table 1. Panel A of Table 2 presents the
coefficients and simulation p-values from the time-series regressions of Equation (3). The
coefficients on SENT decline monotonically up to the 12th month with a little rebound
thereafter, and become significantly negative at a p-value of 0.05 or lower as the
forecasting horizon extends to 11 months and beyond. Panel B of Table 2 illustrates the
trend of the SENT coefficients over time. These results are similar to those of Firth et al.
(2015)15 and validate the sentiment index as an important determinant of stock price.
Furthermore, Figure 1 compares my investor sentiment index with that of Firth et al.
(2015). The two sentiment index lines are almost overlapping from January 2003 to
December 2009, providing direct evidence of the validity of the investor sentiment index

They document that the coefficients on SENT decline monotonically until the fourteenth month and become
significantly negative at a p-value of 0.05 or lower as the forecasting horizon extends to 12 months and beyond.
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in my study.

3.3. Empirical analysis

3.3.1. Sample description and data source

Table 3 shows the sample selection procedures. The initial sample contains all of the firms
that have been listed for at least three years on either the Shanghai or the Shenzhen Ashare exchanges (i.e., firms listed before the end of 2013). I exclude firms listed on the
Growth Enterprise Market because they are relatively small. I also exclude financial firms
and delisted firms. The final sample includes 2,058 firms listed on either the Shanghai or
Shenzhen exchange market. I hand collect the addresses of firms’ headquarters and obtain
longitude and latitude data at the prefecture level from Google map. My investigation
period covers January 2003 to December 2015 and the investor sentiment index has 156
monthly observations. All financial data and stock price data come from the China Stock
Market and Accounting Research (CSMAR) database.

3.3.2. Distance and the investor sentiment effect

I begin by examining the difference in investor sentiment effect between local and
nonlocal firms. And I also exclude firms located exactly in financial centers and retest the
main hypothesis to differentiate the effect of financial centers from the impact of
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geographic distance in the sentiment-driven stock price relationship. Two mechanisms
are related to this issue. First, if the empirical result is consistent with the information
hypothesis, one may expect the relation between geographic distance and the investor
sentiment effect to hold even when firms located in financial centers are excluded from
our sample because information, especially soft information, may not be confined to the
financial center. Second, if the result is in line with the behavioral bias perspective, the
interaction between distance and the investor sentiment effect will not disappear. Social
interactions and the degree of familiarity may not be confined to the financial center, and
there may be some spillover of investor bias in nearby areas. In any case, the relation
between proximity and investor sentiment still holds after excluding firms located in
financial centers.

I measure the geographic distance between a firm’s headquarter and the center of
whichever financial center (Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen) is closest. Specifically, firms
that are headquartered within a certain radius (250 miles, 100 miles and 100 kilometers)
of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are considered as local firms whereas firms that are
headquartered outside the radius are considered nonlocal firms. I also compare the
investor sentiment effect on firms located within a radius of 100 kilometers and firms
outside the radius of 1,000 kilometers to offer clearer evidence of the difference in
investor sentiment effect between local and nonlocal firms. While the investor sentiment
effect becomes statistically significant from the 11-month horizon onwards, I focus on
the time horizons of 9, 12 and 15 months to observe the association between sentiment
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and subsequent returns. Following Brown and Cliff (2005), I investigate the sensitivity
of stock prices to investor sentiment after controlling for the earnings-to-price ratio (EP),
risk free rate (RF), inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama-French factors (MKT, SMB
and HML). The regression model is as follows:
∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾1 𝐸𝑃𝑡 + 𝛾2 𝑅𝐹𝑡 + 𝛾3 𝐼𝑁𝐹𝐿𝑡 + 𝛾4 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝛾5 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 +
𝛾6 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝜀𝑡+𝑘

(4)

where ∑𝐾
𝑘=1 𝐸𝑥𝑅𝐸𝑇𝑡+𝑘 is the K-period portfolio return; SENT is the investor sentiment
index; EP refers to the market-level earnings-to-price ratio; RF is the risk-free rate
measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits; INFL refers to the
monthly inflation rate; MKT is the excess return on market portfolio; SMB refers to the
average return on small stock portfolios over the average returns on large stock portfolios;
and HML refers to the average return on high book-to-market stock portfolios over the
average returns on high book-to-market stock portfolios. I expect β to be significantly
negative as it represents the sensitivity of subsequent returns to investor sentiment. I apply
the same approach as in Equation (3) to cope with the biases in the test statistics. To test
the main hypothesis, I form equal-weighted portfolios on local and nonlocal firms. To
distinguish the effect of geographic distance from that of financial centers, I form equalweighted portfolios on local and nonlocal firms after excluding firms located in Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen.

Table 4 summarizes the number of firms in each portfolio using different geographic
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cutting boundaries with or without firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen,
respectively. I carry out the regression model estimation for the portfolios sorted by
geographic distance. Table 5 reports the SENT coefficient estimation results on local and
nonlocal firms, with the local portfolio consisting of firms headquartered within a radius
of 250 miles, 100 miles or 100 kilometers 16 from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen,
whereas the nonlocal portfolio consists of firms that are headquartered outside these
boundaries. D1 consists of the firms located within a radius of 100 kilometers from
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, whereas D3 consists of firms located outside a radius of
1,000 kilometers from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. For the sake of brevity, I do not
report the coefficients for EP, RF, INFL, MKT, SMB and HML because they are not the
primary focus of my study.17 Consistent with the previous results of the price reversal
shown in Panel B of Table 2 and the results reported by Firth et al. (2015) on corporate
transparency, the bias-adjusted coefficient estimates of SENT over the three horizons are
all negative and significant over 12- and 15-month horizon. Most importantly, in line with
the behavioral bias hypothesis, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than
nonlocal firms (the distance effect). The differences between the SENT coefficients in
local and nonlocal firms are statistically significant across all three horizons for all of the
aforementioned geographic cutting boundaries. The results are also significant in
economic terms. For instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the sentiment index
results in an additional decline of 150 basis points in the stock prices of local firms over

I also test the difference between local and nonlocal firms in terms of sentiment effect using 150miles, 200miles as
local and nonlocal firms cutting boundary, the results are similar.
17 The detailed regression results are available from the author upon request.
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nonlocal firms in the subsequent 12 month-period using the geographic cutting boundary
of 250 miles.

Table 6 summarizes the SENT coefficient estimation results for local and nonlocal firms
after excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Firstly, although the biasadjusted coefficients on SENT are still negative and significant for all firms over 12 and
15 months, the differences between the SENT coefficients in local and nonlocal firms are
marginally significant when using 250 miles and 100 miles as the geographic cutting
boundary. The difference in sentiment coefficients between local and nonlocal firms is
almost zero and insignificant when using 100 kilometers as cutting boundary, but the
number of nonlocal companies are over ten times more than local companies. Secondly,
the magnitude of the differences also declines. For example, local firms bear an additional
decrease of 100 basis points18 in their market value compared with nonlocal firms for a
one standard deviation increase in market optimism for the 12-month horizon when using
100 miles as local and nonlocal cutting boundary. In addition, the differences in the SENT
coefficients between the D1 and D3 portfolios are marginally significant for the above
three horizons, and the magnitude of the difference in sentiment effect between D1 and
D3 portfolio also decreased. For instance, D1 firms bear additional 130 basis points
decrease of their market value than D3 firms in the following 12 months for one standard
deviation increase in market sentiment without firms headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai
or Shenzhen, as compared to a decrease of 290 basis points when including firms in

The additional decrease is 170 basis points when including firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, see
Panel B of Table 4.
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Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen.

I interpret these results as indicating that financial centers play an important but not
indispensable role in the relation between geographic distance and the investor sentiment
effect. Specifically, a financial center offers facilities and intermediaries that facilitate
social interactions in the financial market and therefore increase the level of familiarity
with local firms. However, investors’ behavioral bias may not be confined within the
financial center but may spill out to nearby areas. As a result, the distance effect remains
after excluding firms located within financial centers.

3.3.3. Chinese High Speed Railway reform as an exogenous shock

Next, I use the Chinese HSR reform as an exogenous shock to investigate whether the
construction of transport infrastructure affects the impact of geographic distance on the
sentiment-driven stock price relationship. HSR construction is intended to connect
provincial capitals and other major cities by faster means of transportation, and the
decision on the placement of HSR lines is built on a comprehensive consideration of the
economic development, population and resource distribution, national security,
environmental concerns and social stability of each region (Mid-to-Long Railway Plan,
2008), which have no direct relation with the investor sentiment effect. Therefore, the
HSR reform serves as a reasonable exogenous shock in this setting. Moreover, the
upgrading of transportation reduces both the time and transportation cost of inter-city
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travel. As a result, it may facilitate social interactions between market participants and
thus increase the degree of familiarity. If this were the case, I would expect the distance
effect to decrease or even disappear for firms with headquarters in cities connected to
HSR lines, whereas it should still exist for firms unconnected to HSR lines.

First, I examine the difference in the sentiment effect on nonlocal firms unconnected to
and connected to HSR lines, respectively, before and after the launch of HSR services,
respectively. I pay special attention to whether nonlocal firms are connected to HSR lines
because the magnitude of the decrease in time and transportation costs is lower for local
firms. In order to mitigate the confounding effect of aviation, I restrict nonlocal firms
located within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and do the same
analysis as before. Second, I investigate whether the distance effect exists if I divide firms
into local and nonlocal groups based on travel times by railway, airline and toll road from
the headquarters of a firm to a financial center.

Specifically, I separate 2,058 firms into local and nonlocal portfolios using 250 miles as
the geographic cutting boundary. This procedure yields 1,205 local firms and 853
nonlocal firms. Considering that local firms are within the 250-mile radius of either
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and the lowest speed of HSR lines is 250 km/h, the HSR
reform has much less impact on shortening the travel time for local firms than for nonlocal
firms, I then focus on the effect of HSR connection for nonlocal firms. Specifically, I
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choose 200719 as the event year because China’s HSR service opened on April 18, 2007.
I hand collect the data for the specific year in which a prefecture-level city opened its
HSR service from the China Railway Press and match it with the headquarters of nonlocal
firms. This procedure yields 215 nonlocal firms connected to the HSR in 2007 and 230
nonlocal firms that remain unconnected in 2007 and afterwards. Following Chang and
Wong (2009), I match firms that experienced the HSR shock in 2007 with firms that did
not. I first match each shocked firm with a firm in the same industry that stayed
unconnected to the HSR in 2007 and afterwards. If multiple firms satisfy this criteria,
then I include the firm closest in size to that of the shocked firm in year -1. I find 205
unconnected firms that are matched with shocked firms on the basis of industry and firm
size.

Applying the same approach taken for Equation (4), I sort the portfolios on local and
nonlocal firms, respectively. While the group of local firms remains unchanged, nonlocal
firms are divided into two groups according to the foregoing procedure. Specifically, I
compute the difference in equal-weighted portfolio returns between local and nonlocal
firms unconnected to HSR lines (control group) and between local and nonlocal firms
that experienced HSR reform (treatment group), respectively. Then, I investigate the
difference in the relation between distance and the investor sentiment effect on the
treatment and control groups both before and after 2007. In addition, I restrict nonlocal

I also try to use different years as the event year. However, there are only 31 nonlocal firms and 50 nonlocal firms
that began connected to HSR in 2008 and 2009, respectively. The results are less meaningful due to small sample
size.
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firms located within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and do the
same analysis on treatment and control group, respectively to mitigate the confounding
effect of aviation.

Moreover, I divide firms into local and nonlocal groups according to the travel times from
a firm’s headquarters to a financial center. The measurement of travel times is based on
a comprehensive consideration of railway, airline and toll road. Firstly, for firms located
within 300 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, I assume that market
participants can reach financial centers by toll road within 4 hours20 since the average
speed of the National Trunk Highway System is 100 km/h (Li and Shum, 2001) and
considering that there may exist some curves on toll road because the construction of toll
road is based on the consideration of regional development21; Secondly, I hand collect the
shortest travel time from the headquarter of a firm to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen via
railway (including HSR) from Chinese Railway Press from 2006 to 2013. I add one hour
to all the travel time by train for market participants to travel to railway station and come
to their destination. Finally, for firms located outside 1500 kilometer-radius22 of Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen, I hand collect the travel time from a firm to the nearest financial
center by plane from Ctrip. I also add 3 hours for all the travel time by plane since
passengers are supposed to arrive in airport 2 hours before the airplane take off and I
leave 1 hour for them to come to airport and get to their destination. Firms located in the

20
21
22

A one-day round business trip.
I leave 100 kilometers for the curve.
The competitive radius of HSR is within 1500 kilometer-radius.
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cities within 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are grouped as local firms
whereas firms headquartered in the cities exceed 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or
Shenzhen are classified as nonlocal firms. In order to better test the role of travel time in
sentiment-driven stock price relationship, I further group firms located in the cities within
4 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen as local firms whereas firms headquartered in
the cities exceed 12 hours to Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen are classified as nonlocal
firms. I then examine whether the distance effect exists for local and nonlocal firms based
on travel time following the same approach as for Equation (4).

Table 7 reports the SENT coefficient estimation results for the treatment group. Panel A
shows that the distance effect exists before the HSR reform. Specifically, local firms are
more affected by investor sentiment than nonlocal firms from 2003 to 2006 across three
time horizons. For instance, an increase of one standard deviation in the sentiment index
results in a decline of an additional 390 basis points in the stock prices of local over
nonlocal firms in the subsequent 12-monthperiod. However, the distance effect
disappears after the HSR reform in 2007. Panel B of Table 7 shows that the differences
in the SENT coefficient estimation between local and nonlocal firms becomes
insignificant, although the biased-adjusted SENT coefficients are universally and
significantly negative for the three horizons. Moreover, the distance effect for the
treatment group also disappears for the whole sample period from 2003 to 2015, as
reported in Panel C of Table 7.
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In contrast, in the control group, local firms are more affected by investor sentiment than
nonlocal firms across the three sample periods, namely, 2003 to 2006, 2007 to 2015 and
2003 to 2015, as reported in Table 8, Panels A to C. For example, local firms bear a
decrease of an extra 290 basis points in their market prices compared with nonlocal firms
for each one standard deviation increase in investor optimism for the 12-month horizon
before the HSR reform in 2007, and this distance effect is also significant from 2007 to
2015. Local firms bear an additional 320-point decline in their market value over nonlocal
firms in the subsequent 15 months for each one standard deviation increase in the
sentiment index over the whole sample period from 2003 to 2015. Obviously, the distance
effect holds for the control group when nonlocal firms remain unconnected to the HSR.

Furthermore, Figure 2 presents the trends of the differences in the SENT coefficients over
a 24-month period on the time-series regressions of Equation (4) before and after the HSR
reform for the treatment group and control group, respectively. Panel A shows that the
trends for the two groups are quite similar. Both of the lines are negative over the 24month period, suggesting that local firms are more affected by the general market
sentiment than nonlocal firms in both the treatment and control groups before the HSR
reform. However, after the reform, the gap between the SENT coefficients of the two
groups becomes larger. Specifically, the differences in the SENT coefficients for the
treatment group are generally positive, indicating that nonlocal firms are more affected
by investor sentiment, although this relation is insignificant. In contrast, the differences
in the SENT coefficients for the control group are generally negative, suggesting that the
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distance effect still exists after the HSR reform for control group.

Table 9 and Table 10 conduct the same analysis as in Table7 and Table 8 but restrict the
firms headquartered within 1500 kilometer-radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. The
results are robust in the competitive radii of HSR.

The above results provide support for the notion that the construction of transportation
infrastructure may alter the effect of geographic distance on the sentiment-driven stock
price relationship. To put it another way, I verify the importance of geographic distance
in explaining the sensitivity of stock prices to market sentiment using the HSR reform as
an exogenous shock to test the changes in the distance effect on the treatment and control
groups.

Table 11 reports the results for the relation between travel time and sentiment effect.
Firms with shorter travel times to a financial center are more affected by investor
sentiment than their counterparts. Panel A shows that firms within a 12-hour travel
distance of a financial center are more affected by investor sentiment than firms with a
travel distance of more than 12 hours to either Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Panel B
summarizes that firms within a 4-hour travel time of a financial center are more affected
by investor sentiment than firms with a travel time of more than 12 hours to either Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen. For both Panel A and Panel B, the SENT coefficients become
more negative as the travel time from a firm’s headquarters to the nearest financial center
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decreases. For instance, the SENT coefficients for firms within a 4-hour travel time are
considerably lower than those of their control counterparts and their differences are all
statistically significant at the 5% level across the three horizons. These results provide
important evidence that travel time is a channel to stimulate social interactions across
cities and firms located in cities near financial center bear higher degree of familiarity
than other firms.

3.3.4. Additional analyses

3.3.4.1. Stock market participation and investor sentiment effect

To offer more evidence for the behavioral bias hypothesis, I examine the relation between
the stock market participation rate and investor sentiment effect. Brown et al. (2008)
establish a casual relation between an individual’s decision to own a stock and the average
stock market participation rate of the individual’s community. They further argue that
word-of-mouth communication drives this causal effect. This study supports the notion
that social interactions affect the regional stock market participation rate. The mechanism
by which the market participation rate influences the sentiment-driven stock price relation
is as follows. Provinces with a high stock market participation rate are likely to have more
investors talking about their investments, which could increase the degree of familiarity.
For instance, investors may envy others’ success in the stock market and follow their
neighbors or acquaintances in buying certain stocks when they have little information
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about the fundamentals of these stocks. Therefore, firms headquartered in provinces with
a high market participation rate are affected more by investor sentiment than firms
headquartered in low market participation regions. I conduct the following test to support
my argument.

I divide firms into portfolios based on the stock market participation rate of the province
where a firm’s headquarters is located from 2003 to 2014. 23 Specifically, the stock
market participation rate is defined as the provincial-level total stock accounts divided by
the year-end population in that province. Firms located in the top three24 stock market
participation provinces are identified as high stock market participation firms and the rest
as low stock market participation firms each year. I apply the same approach taken for
Equation (4) to compare the difference in the investor sentiment effect for High firms and
Low firms.

Panel A of Table 12 lists the top three provinces in terms of the stock market participation
rate from 2003 to 2014. The table shows that Shanghai always ranks first, ranging from
43.79% in 2005 to 80.90% in 2009, followed by Beijing, Guangdong and Tianjin. In
addition, the participation rate in these provinces increases across years, suggesting the
development of the financial market in China. Panel B of Table 12 reports the regression
results for the relation between the investor sentiment effect and the stock market

Before April 2015, a person could only open only one stock trading account in China. In most cases, investor’s
account address and living address are same.
24 I consider the top three provinces because the stock market participation rate in other provinces is quite low,
around 10% or lower from 2003 to 2014.
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participation rate. Across three horizons, I consistently find that the SENT coefficients
on high stock market participation firms are more negative than those on their
counterparts. The High-minus-Low portfolio comparison suggests that the differences in
the SENT coefficients are highly significant. This result supports the behavioral bias
hypothesis by offering evidence that firms located in the provinces with high market
participation are more affected by investor sentiment than firms located in other provinces.

3.3.4.2. Number of analyst recommendations and the investor sentiment effect

In addition, I seek additional evidence to explain why firms that are headquartered
proximate to a financial center are more affected by market sentiment than firms that are
farther away. I pay special attention to sell-side analysts because they are in charge of
offering investment advice to their clients and generating more trades for brokerage firms,
and because their workplaces are predominantly located in or near financial centers. Thus,
analysts may conveniently choose to cover more local than nonlocal firms given the time
and transportation costs. Moreover, previous studies document that sell-side analysts
reveal an overoptimistic bias in their earnings forecasts or stock recommendations and
attribute it to their strategic behavior or cognitive bias (e.g., Brown, 1997; Lin and
McNichols, 1998; Qian, 2009; Firth et al., 2013). Most importantly, investor sentiment
can affect analysts. Bagnoli et al. (2009) suggest that analysts who know that investor
sentiment has an impact on stock prices pay attention to market sentiment when issuing
stock recommendations. If this is the case, analysts’ behavioral bias may fuel the degree
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of familiarity and thereby intensify the sentiment effect near financial centers.

Following Hribar and McInnis (2012), I calculate the analysts’ forecast errors on local
and nonlocal portfolios, respectively, and compare the difference in analysts’ optimistic
bias between local and nonlocal firms. However, the difference is not statistically
significant.25A plausible explanation is that analysts know that unsophisticated individual
investors pay more attention to the frequency of recommendations rather than the
earnings forecasts and use investors’ psychological bias to fuel the investor sentiment
effect on local firms.

I then examine the impact of the number of analyst recommendations on the sentimentdriven stock price relationship. Following Bergman and Roychowdhury (2008), I
investigate the association between sentiment and number of analyst recommendations
on local and nonlocal firms using the following regression model:
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝜀𝑖𝑡

(5)

The dependent variable 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 is the quarterly stock recommendation frequency issued
for firm 𝑖 in quarter t. I compute the quarterly recommendation frequency based on three
types, namely, “Strong buy”, “Buy” and “Hold or worse,” and run the preceding
regression for each of these three types. 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 is the average monthly investor

25

The result is available upon request.
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sentiment index in quarter t-1 and Local is a dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is
local and 0 otherwise. 𝑋𝑡−1 represents a vector of quarterly control variables including
the seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in quarter t-1 (GDPCHG), gross
returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months before the beginning of
quarter t (PASTMARKET), and the volatility of gross market returns during the 12
months before the beginning of quarter t (MARKETVOL). 𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 stands for a vector of
firm-quarter control variables that contains the natural logarithm of a firm’s asset value
Size, book-to-market ratio (BTM) and gross market returns over the past 12 months
(RET), and the standard deviation of each firm’s monthly returns over the past 12 months
(RETVOL). I also include lagged capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets
(CAPEX) and lagged return on assets (ROA) as control variables. All of the firm-level
control variables are winsorized at the 1% level to reduce the effect of outliers. I include
the binary indicator variables for firms that report a loss in any of the previous four
quarters (LOSS) and for firm quarters containing equity issues (ISSUE). I further include
the institutional ownership (IOHLD) of each firm to control for the institutional attention.
Finally, I include firm and year fixed effects because the number of analyst
recommendations increases during my sample period, as shown in Panel B of Table 13.
All of the analyst recommendation and stock price data are taken from CSMAR and the
GDP data are from the Statistical Bureau of the PRC from 2003 to 2015.

Panel A of Table 13 reports the univariate test results for quarterly analyst coverage on
local and nonlocal firms from 2003 to 2015. Analyst coverage equals 0 if no analyst is
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following a firm in a certain quarter. Analyst coverage for local firms is then computed
as the number of analysts who issued stock recommendations for firms located within a
250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, and that for nonlocal firms as the
number of analysts who issued stock recommendations for firms headquartered outside
this radius. The univariate analysis shows that more analysts follow local than nonlocal
firms, and the difference is statistically significant at the 1% level. Although the
magnitude is small, I attribute it to many of the 2,058 firms in my sample period receiving
no analyst attention.

Table 14 summarizes the regression results for the relation between the number of stock
recommendations and investor sentiment for local and nonlocal firms. The summary
statistics of the variables in the regression are presented in Panel A of Table 14. The mean
quarterly frequency of “Strong buy” recommendations in the sample is 3.16, and the
average quarterly frequencies of “Buy” recommendations and “Hold or worse”
recommendations are 4.45 and 0.89, respectively. The average number of stock
recommendations in each quarter is 8.5. While the average firm is followed by two
analysts each quarter, the mean institutional ownership of the firms in the sample is 2.28%.
On average, 57% of firms are classified in the local group in my sample. Panel B of Table
14 reports the initial results for the relationship between stock recommendations and
investor sentiment in terms of local and nonlocal firms. On average, local firms have 41
more “Strong buy” recommendations than nonlocal firms in each quarter. This number is
significant in economic terms because the mean number of “Strong buy”
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recommendations in the sample is 3.16. The local firms also have 27 more “Buy”
recommendations than nonlocal firms on average. Moreover, the significantly positive
interaction of Local and SENT for “Strong buy” recommendations indicates that such
recommendations are more likely for local firms when investor sentiment is high.

However, analysts self-select whether to follow a firm. Rather than local firms’
geographic location, these results could be driven solely by local firms being followed by
more overoptimistic analysts, making the firms subject to more overoptimistic
recommendations. To address this problem, I use Heckman’s two-stage method to
address the concern of a self-selection bias. First, I use the following probit regression to
estimate the probability of a firm receiving a stock recommendation:
𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽0 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 +
𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(6)

where 𝑇𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡 is a dummy variable that equals 1 if firm 𝑖 has analyst
recommendations in quarter t, and 0 otherwise. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 is the number of firms in the
same industry as firm 𝑖 in quarter t. 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 is associated with the probability of issuing
stock recommendations because the information gathering cost reduces as the number of
firms in a certain industry increases, but it has no obvious relation to whether a firm
receives a certain type of stock recommendation. This variable is used for identification
purposes. The definitions of the other control variables are the same as those given for
Equation (5). In the second stage, I use the following regression to re-estimate the relation
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between stock recommendations and investor sentiment on local and nonlocal firms after
controlling for macro- and firm-level variables by including the inverse Mills ratio
obtained from the first-stage regression:
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑄𝑖𝑡 = 𝛼 + 𝛽1 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 + 𝛽2 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛽3 𝐿𝑜𝑐𝑎𝑙𝑖 ∗ 𝑆𝐸𝑁𝑇𝑡−1 + 𝛾𝑋𝑡−1 + 𝛿𝑍𝑖𝑡−1 +
𝛽4 𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎 + 𝜀𝑖𝑡

(7)

where 𝐿𝑎𝑚𝑏𝑑𝑎 is the inverse Mills ratio obtained from the first-stage regression. Panel
C of Table 14 reports the result for Equation (6). The coefficient on 𝑁𝑈𝑀𝑖𝑡 is
significantly positive, suggesting that a firm is more likely to receive analyst coverage
when there are more firms operating in the same industry. In addition, a firm is more
likely to be covered by analysts when market sentiment, book-to-market ratio, return on
assets, capital expenditure percentage, institutional ownership, past returns and past
market volatility are high, and if the firm is large or located close to a financial center,
while past return volatility, gross returns on market index and seasonally adjusted GDP
are low or suffered a loss in the last quarter.

Panel D of Table 14 reports the regression results for Equation (7). Compared with the
baseline model in Panel C of Table 14, where I did not correct for the self-selection bias,
the main results still hold. Specifically, the coefficients of SENT for “Strong buy” and
“Buy” recommendations are significantly positive, suggesting that analysts issue more
positive stock recommendations when investor sentiment is high. Similar to the results
for the baseline regression, local firms obtain more “Strong buy” recommendations and
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“Buy” recommendations. When investor sentiment is high, local firms get more “Strong
buy” recommendations.

In sum, these results suggest that local firms receive more favorable recommendations
than nonlocal firms. When investor sentiment is high (low), local firms have more (fewer)
“Strong buy” recommendations than nonlocal firms. The results from the Heckman twostage model suggest that the overall results are unlikely to be driven by a self-selection
bias.

Furthermore, I investigate the implications of stock recommendations on the value of
local and nonlocal firms. Following Firth et al. (2013), I examine the stock market’s
reaction to analyst recommendations upon report issuance. Specifically, I focus on the
cumulative abnormal returns (CARs) centered on the recommendation date over the
three-day event window from one day before until one day after. I use the market-adjusted
abnormal returns, defined as the stock’s return over the value-weighted market returns
for firms listed on the Shanghai and Shenzhen stock exchanges. I then cumulate the daily
abnormal returns over the three-day event window to get the three-day CARs (CAR(1,+1)). Panel E of Table 14 shows that positive recommendations, including “Strong buy”
and “Buy” recommendations, generate significantly positive three-day CARs for both
local and nonlocal firms, whereas negative “Hold or worse” recommendations produce
significantly negative three-day CARs for both local and nonlocal firms, suggesting that
favorable recommendations have a positive effect on short-term stock prices while
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unfavorable ones have a negative effect on short-term prices. In addition, the abnormal
returns for the three types of recommendations on local firms are all significantly greater
than those for nonlocal firms, suggesting that market reactions to the stock
recommendations for local firms are more optimistic than those for nonlocal firms, which
is consistent with the conjecture that the familiarity bias is initiated near financial centers
and financial analysts fuel investors’ behavioral bias.

3.3.4.3 Institutional ownership and investor sentiment

Previous literatures document that local institutional investors can utilize informational
advantages and realize abnormal returns in their local investments (e.g.: Coval and
Moskowitz, 2001; Baik et al., 2010). As institutional investors are mainly located near
financial centers, some may argue that local firms may have higher institutional
ownership than nonlocal firms and institutional investor may play a role in the relation
between distance and sentiment-driven stock price relationship.

I do a two-way and a four-way analysis to address this concern. Table 15 reports a
comparison of institutional holdings between local and nonlocal firms in high- and lowsentiment period. Specifically, Panel A of Table 15 shows that there is no significantly
differences between local and nonlocal firms in terms of institutional ownership. In Panel
B, when investor sentiment is high, institutional investors buy more stocks indiscriminate
of local and nonlocal firms than low-sentiment period. For example, institutional
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ownership of high-sentiment period is 0.75%26 more than that of low-sentiment period
for nonlocal firms. However, the difference of institutional holding between local and
nonlocal firms within each sentimental group is not statistically significant. These results
help to relief the concern that the geographic component in the sentiment-driven stock
price relationship is driven by institutional investors and supports the notion that it is the
retail investors who are relatively inexperienced and more prone to market sentiment may
drive our main result.

3.3.4.4. GDP and the investor sentiment effect

Some may argue that the distance effect could be caused by different levels of economic
development rather than cognitive bias as I propose, as regions located near to financial
centers also tend to be more developed economically. For example, investors who reside
in more economically developed regions tend to be richer and may be more willing to
take risks or even to gamble when investing in the stock market. If this is the case, one
may expect firms headquartered in more developed areas to be more affected by investor
sentiment than other firms.

To address this concern, I investigate the relation between GDP and the investor
sentiment effect. I divide firms into portfolios based on the nominal GDP of the province
where a firm’s headquarters is located from 2003 to 2015. Firms located in the top 10

26

This magnitude is significant since the mean of institutional holding is 2.28%.
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GDP provinces are identified as High GDP firms and those in other provinces as Low
GDP firms in each year. I apply the same approach as for Equation (4) to compare the
difference in the investor sentiment effect on High and Low portfolios.

Panel A of Table 16 presents the regression results for the relation between GDP and the
investor sentiment effect. I find the consistent result that the SENT coefficients on high
GDP firms are no more negative than those on low GDP firms across three horizons. The
High-minus-Low portfolio comparison suggests that the differences in SENT coefficients
are not significant. Panel B of Table 16 conducts the regression analysis on GDP and the
sentiment effect after excluding firms located in either Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong
(where Shenzhen is located) and the results are similar across three horizons. These
results support the notion that my main result on the distance effect is not driven by
different levels of economic development.

Chapter 4. Conclusions

This study examines the role of geographic distance in the sentiment-driven stock price
relationship in the context of China’s stock market. I provide comprehensive evidence
that firms with greater proximity to financial centers are more affected by the general
market sentiment than firms far away from financial centers. In addition, using the
Chinese HSR reform as an exogenous shock, I find that the relation between distance and
the investor sentiment effect disappears for firms that become connected to HSR lines but
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holds for firms that stay unconnected, suggesting that upgrading the transport
infrastructure facilitates social interactions and mitigates the importance of geographic
distance in the sentiment-driven stock price relation. Moreover, I find that firms within a
4-hour travel distance to a financial center are more affected by sentiment than those that
are more than 12 hours away. The result confirms that travel time is an important
determinant of the investor sentiment effect. Finally, I offer additional evidence for the
relation between geographic distance and the sensitivity of stock price to investor
sentiment. First, firms located in provinces with higher stock market participation rates
are more affected by investor sentiment than firms headquartered in other provinces.
Second, analysts increase the frequency of favorable recommendations for firms that are
located closer to financial centers when investor sentiment is high and the stock market
reactions to analyst recommendations are in line with my findings. Finally, I provide
evidence that the distance effect is not driven by institutional investors or regional
economic development. Overall, my study highlights the importance of geographic
distance in explaining investor sentiment effects.
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Table 1: Summary statistics of investor sentiment data and control variables
This table reports the summary statistics for the sentiment component from 2003 to 2015.
CEFD is the value-weighted average discount rate of closed-end mutual funds. TURN is
the natural log of monthly market trading volume divided by the average market value,
detrended by the 5-month moving average. NIPO is the monthly number of initial public
offerings. RIPO is the average market-adjusted first-day returns of initial public offerings.
Eshare is the ratio of equity issues to total equity issues and bank borrowing. DSG is the
growth rate of savings deposits controlling for the growth of money supply (M0). NACT
is the natural log of new investment accounts (in thousands). SENT is the first principal
component of the seven sentiment proxies.
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the raw sentiment component. In Panel B, I
regress each of the seven proxies on the growth in industrial production and consumption
growth rate. The orthogonalized proxies, prefixed with “residual,” are the residuals from
these regressions. SENT_1 is the first principal component of the seven orthogonalized
proxies. In Panel C, EP is the market-level earnings-to-price ratio. RF is the risk-free rate,
measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits. INFL is the monthly
rate of inflation. MKT is the excess return on the market portfolio of stocks. SMB (HML)
is the difference each month between average returns on the small-stock portfolio (the
high BM portfolio) and average returns on the large-stock portfolio (the low BM
portfolio). *** denotes significance at the 0.01 level, ** at the 0.05 level and * at the 0.1
level.
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Panel A: Raw data
Variable
CEFD_t（%）
TURN_t-1
NIPO_t
RIPO_t-1(%)
Eshare_t(%)
DSG_t-1(%)
NACT_t-1

CEFD

TURN

NIPO

Mean SD
P25
Median P75
17.85 12.28
6.74
16.43 26.03
6.10 0.48
5.75
6.03 6.42
7.64 7.25
0.00
6.00 13.00
0.77 0.77
0.36
0.58 0.92
1.34 1.45
0.42
0.94 1.78
0.05 0.88
-0.39
0.06 0.46
6.22 1.27
5.11
6.26 7.04

Correlation
CEFD_t（%）
TURN_t-1
NIPO_t
RIPO_t-1(%)
Eshare_t(%)

RIPO

Eshare

1
-0.0627
-0.2629***
0.2417***
0.0331

DSG_t-1(%)

0.0964

NACT_t-1

-0.4975***

1
0.2460*** 1
0.2124** -0.1740*
1
0.4302*** 0.4492*** 0.4015*** 1
-0.1680** -0.1740** -0.1173
0.2740***
0.7467*** 0.4434*** 0.1518
0.4052***

SENT

-0.1952**

0.8600*** 0.5834*** 0.3065*** 0.6822***

SENT_1

-0.1018

0.7683*** 0.4944*** 0.3235*** 0.6872***

63

DSG

NACT

SENT

SENT_1

1
-0.2030**
0.4601***
0.5378***

1
0.8527*** 1
0.6997*** 0.9102*** 1

Panel B: Controlling for macroeconomic conditions
Variable
residual_CEFD_t
（%）
residual_TURN_t-1
residual_NIPO_t
residual_RIPO_t-1(%)
residual_Eshare_t(%)
residual_DSG_t-1(%)
residual_NACT_t-1
Correlation
R_CEFD_t（%）
R_TURN_t-1
R_NIPO_t
R_RIPO_t-1(%)
R_Eshare_t(%)
R_DSG_t-1(%)
R_NACT_t-1
SENT
SENT_1

R_CEFD
1
0.0793
-0.3861***
0.1616*
-0.0739
0.1002
-0.4462***
-0.1291
-0.1128

Mean

SD

P25

P50

P75

0.00 10.09

-6.27

-3.73

6.94

0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00

-0.30
-6.10
-0.38
-0.78
-0.43
-0.63

-0.09
-1.08
-0.09
-0.34
0.03
-0.12

0.32
4.25
0.11
0.47
0.40
0.55

0.45
7.00
0.74
1.39
0.88
1.07

R_TURN

R_NIPO

R_RIPO

R_Eshare

R_DSG

R_NACT

1
0.2155***
0.2111**
0.4455***
-0.1877**
0.7005***
0.7809***
0.8313***

1
-0.2095**
0.4073***
-0.1956**
0.4356***
0.4846***
0.5035***

1
0.3549***
-0.1397
0.1834*
0.2857***
0.3398***

1
-0.3036***
0.4389***
0.6334***
0.7201***

1
-0.2591***
-0.4787***
-0.5386***

1
0.7538*** 1
0.8365*** 0.9102*** 1
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SENT

SENT_1

Panel C: SENT and control variables

Variable
SENT
EP（%）
RF（%）
INFL
（%）
MKT
SMB
HML

Correlation SENT
SENT
1
EP（%）
-0.1224
RF（%）
INFL
（%）
MKT
SMB
HML

-0.0239

Mean
0.000
0.089
0.224

SD
1.000
0.031
0.054

P25
-0.677
0.062
0.188

P50
-0.073
0.083
0.210

P75
0.592
0.106
0.250

2.761

2.112

1.400

2.400

4.000

0.009
0.009
0.001

0.089
0.047
0.033

-0.051
-0.015
-0.017

0.015
0.011
0.000

0.055
0.036
0.019

EP
1
0.2915***

RF

INFL

MKT

SMB

HML

1
0.1715**
0.0903

1
-0.4872***

1

1

-0.0645

-0.371***

0.6688*** 1

0.1929**
0.1211
-0.0694

0.2192***
-0.1646**
0.0976

-0.1881**
0.0091
0.0333
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-0.2712***
-0.0126
0.0304

Table 2: Validation of the sentiment index and its relation with future stock
returns
This table reports the results from the time-series regression of excess market returns
on investor sentiment over a 24-month period in Equation (3). Panel A presents the
coefficients from the time-series regressions; the simulated p-values reported in
parentheses are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient does not
equal 0. Panel B shows the graph of the SENT coefficient β over time.
Panel A: Time-series regressions of excess market returns on investor sentiment (SENT)
K

1

2

3

4

5

6

7

8

β*100
p-value
K

0.95
(0.19)
9

0.84
(0.19)
10

0.33
(0.18)
11

-0.01
(0.82)
12

-0.20
(0.95)
13

-0.23
(0.72)
14

-0.43
(0.56)
15

-0.64
(0.33)
16

β*100
p-value
K

-0.84
(0.20)
17

-0.99
(0.10)
18

-1.09
(0.05)
19

-1.12
(0.03)
20

-1.09
(0.01)
21

-1.12
(0.01)
22

-1.10
(0.00)
23

-1.05
(0.00)
24

β*100
p-value

-0.99
(0.00)

-0.96
(0.00)

-1.01
(0.00)

-1.00
(0.00)

-0.98
(0.00)

-0.98
(0.00)

-0.97
(0.00)

-0.96
(0.00)

Panel B: Graph of the SENT coefficient β over time
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Figure 1: Comparison of sentiment indices
This graph compares the investor sentiment indices. sentiment1 (dotted line) is the sentiment index constructed by Firth et al. (2015),
whereas sentiment2 (solid line) represents the sentiment index formulated in this study.
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Table 3: Sample selection
This table presents the sample selection procedure for firms listed on China’s A-share
market.

1. All firms listed on the A-share market before the end of 2013
2. Dropping firms listed on the Growth Enterprise Market
3. Dropping financial firms
4. Dropping delisted firms

68

No.
Observations
2,549
2,194
2,148
2,058

Table 4: Number of firms in each geographic portfolio
This table summarizes the number of firms sorted in each portfolio using different
geographic cutting boundaries. Panel A (Panel B) reports the number of firms in local
and nonlocal portfolios including (excluding) firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or
Shenzhen when applying 100kilometers, 100 miles and 250 miles as local and nonlocal
cutting boundary; Panel C (Panel D) report the number of firms in D1, D2 and D3
portfolio including (excluding) firms headquartered in Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen,
where D1 represents the number of firms located within a 100-kilometer radius of
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, while D3 shows the number of firms headquartered
outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and D2 stands for
firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and
1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen.
Panel A: The number of firms on local and nonlocal portfolio including firms located in Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen

Cutting Boundary
100kilometers
100miles
250miles

Local firms
610
831
1205

Nonlocal firms
1448
1227
853

Total
2058
2058
2058

Panel B: The number of firms on local and nonlocal portfolio excluding firms located in Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen

Cutting Boundary
100kilometers
100miles
250miles

Local firms
108
329
703

Nonlocal firms
1448
1227
853

Total
1556
1556
1556

Panel C: The number of firms on D1, D2 and D3 portfolio including firms located in Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen

D1
610

D2
1213

D3
235

Total
2058

Panel D: The number of firms on D1, D2 and D3 portfolio excluding firms located in Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen

D1
108

D2
1213

D3
235
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Total
1556

Table 5: Geographic distance and the investor sentiment effect
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are defined as for Equation 4. I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on
local firms and Nonlocal represents those on nonlocal firms. Local–Nonlocal represents
the difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A
uses 250 miles as the cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms, Panel B uses 100
miles and Panel C uses 100 kilometers. D1 represents the average returns of firms
located within a 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, while D3
shows the average returns of firms headquartered outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and D2 stands for the average returns of firms located
between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer
radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Simulated p-values are reported in
parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β
does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 250 miles as the
local–nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.065
(0.18)
-0.104
(0.04)
-0.116
(0.02)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
-0.012
(0.01)
-0.015
(0.03)
-0.017
(0.06)

Nonlocal
-0.053
(0.32)
-0.090
(0.10)
-0.099
(0.07)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 miles as the
local–nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.069
(0.15)
-0.109
(0.03)
-0.120
(0.01)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
-0.014
(0.00)
-0.017
(0.01)
-0.019
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.055
(0.30)
-0.091
(0.09)
-0.101
(0.06)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers as
the local–nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.071
(0.14)
-0.110
(0.03)
-0.122
(0.01)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
-0.015
(0.00)
-0.017
(0.02)
-0.019
(0.05)

Nonlocal
-0.055
(0.28)
-0.093
(0.09)
-0.101
(0.05)

Panel D: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers and
1,000 kilometers as the boundary dividing D1, D2 and D3

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

D1
-0.070
(0.13)
-0.110
(0.02)
-0.123
(0.01)

D2
-0.058
(0.25)
-0.096
(0.07)
-0.105
(0.03)
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D3
-0.047
(0.39)
-0.081
(0.13)
-0.088
(0.08)

D1-D3
-0.024
(0.00)
-0.029
(0.00)
-0.034
(0.00)

Table6: Geographic distance and the investor sentiment effect (excluding firms
located in financial center)
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4) after excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or
Shenzhen. I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio formed
on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns of local firms and
Nonlocal those of nonlocal firms. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the
average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A uses 250 miles as the
cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms, Panel B uses 100 miles and Panel C 100
kilometers; D1 represents the average returns of firms located within a 100-kilometer
radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while D3 shows the average returns of firms
headquartered outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen, D2
stands for the average returns of firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing,
Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen..
Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the
hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.

72

Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 250 miles as the
local–nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.059
(0.23)
-0.098
(0.06)
-0.108
(0.03)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
-0.006
(0.11)
-0.008
(0.10)
-0.010
(0.13)

Nonlocal
-0.053
(0.32)
-0.090
(0.10)
-0.099
(0.07)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 miles as the
local and nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.062
(0.20)
-0.101
(0.05)
-0.111
(0.03)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
-0.007
(0.01)
-0.010
(0.01)
-0.011
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.054
(0.30)
-0.091
(0.09)
-0.099
(0.06)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers as
the local–nonlocal boundary

Horizon

Local
-0.056
(0.26)
-0.094
(0.07)
-0.104
(0.04)

9 months
12 months
15 months

LocalNonlocal
0.000
(0.93)
-0.001
(0.92)
-0.001
(0.94)

Nonlocal
-0.056
(0.27)
-0.093
(0.08)
-0.102
(0.05)

Panel D: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 100 kilometers and
1,000 kilometers as the boundary dividing D1, D2 and D3

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

D1
-0.056
(0.26)
-0.094
(0.06)
-0.105
(0.03)

D2
-0.058
(0.25)
-0.097
(0.07)
-0.105
(0.03)
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D3
-0.046
(0.41)
-0.081
(0.13)
-0.088
(0.08)

D1-D3
-0.009
(0.08)
-0.013
(0.10)
-0.016
(0.09)

Table 7: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal
firms connected to HSR lines
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal
represents the returns on firms outside these radii. Local–Nonlocal represents the
difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports
the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform
(2003-2006). Panel B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment
group after the HSR reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio
regression on the treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated
p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that
the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2003 to 2006

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
0.149
(0.01)
0.104
(0.08)
0.016
(0.94)

Nonlocal
0.194
(0.01)
0.144
(0.04)
0.036
(0.75)

Local–
Nonlocal
-0.045
(0.00)
-0.039
(0.00)
-0.019
(0.03)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2007 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.110
(0.01)
-0.141
(0.00)
-0.119
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.115
(0.01)
-0.143
(0.00)
-0.120
(0.01)

Local–
Nonlocal
0.005
(0.42)
0.003
(0.72)
0.001
(0.92)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2003 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.066
(0.18)
-0.105
(0.04)
-0.116
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.059
(0.27)
-0.097
(0.09)
-0.108
(0.06)
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Local–
Nonlocal
-0.006
(0.51)
-0.007
(0.54)
-0.007
(0.65)

Table 8: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal
firms unconnected to HSR lines
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4) for the control group (local and nonlocal firms that are
unconnected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while
Nonlocal stands for the average stock returns on firms headquartered outside these radii.
Local–Nonlocal represents the differences in the average stock returns between local
and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the
control group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel B reports the equal-weighted
portfolio regression on the control group after the HSR reform (2007-2015). Panel C
reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the control group for the whole
sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for
two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2003 to 2006

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
0.149
(0.01)
0.104
(0.08)
0.016
(0.94)

Nonlocal
0.177
(0.01)
0.133
(0.04)
0.041
(0.65)

Local–
Nonlocal
-0.028
(0.00)
-0.029
(0.00)
-0.024
(0.00)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2007 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.110
(0.01)
-0.141
(0.00)
-0.119
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.096
(0.02)
-0.124
(0.00)
-0.098
(0.02)

Local–
Nonlocal
-0.014
(0.03)
-0.017
(0.08)
-0.022
(0.08)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2003 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.065
(0.18)
-0.104
(0.04)
-0.116
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.041
(0.49)
-0.076
(0.18)
-0.083
(0.13)
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Local–
Nonlocal
-0.024
(0.00)
-0.029
(0.00)
-0.032
(0.01)

Table 9: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and nonlocal
firms connected to HSR lines for subsamples
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal
represents the returns on firms outside these radii but within 1500 kilometer-radius of
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the average
stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted
portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel
B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment group after the HSR
reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the
treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are
reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope
coefficient β does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2003 to 2006

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
0.149
(0.01)
0.105
(0.09)
0.017
(0.94)

Nonlocal
0.193
(0.01)
0.144
(0.05)
0.035
(0.74)

LocalNonlocal
-0.045
(0.00)
-0.040
(0.00)
-0.019
(0.04)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2007 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.111
(0.01)
-0.140
(0.00)
-0.119
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.115
(0.01)
-0.144
(0.00)
-0.120
(0.01)

LocalNonlocal
0.005
(0.41)
0.003
(0.73)
0.001
(0.91)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms connected to HSR lines
from 2003 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.065
(0.17)
-0.104
(0.04)
-0.115
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.059
(0.27)
-0.096
(0.09)
-0.108
(0.06)
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LocalNonlocal
-0.006
(0.50)
-0.007
(0.55)
-0.007
(0.64)

Table 10: Geographic distance and investor sentiment effect for local and
nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR lines for subsamples
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4) for the treatment group (local and nonlocal firms that are
connected to HSR lines). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on geographic distance. Local represents the average stock returns on
firms located within a 250-mile radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and Nonlocal
represents the returns on firms outside these radii but within 1500 kilometer-radius of
Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the difference in the average
stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Panel A reports the equal-weighted
portfolio regression on the treatment group before the HSR reform (2003-2006). Panel
B reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on treatment group after the HSR
reform (2007-2015). Panel C reports the equal-weighted portfolio regression on the
treatment group for the whole sample period (2003-2015). Simulated p-values are
reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the slope
coefficient β does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2003 to 2006

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
0.149
(0.01)
0.105
(0.09)
0.017
(0.93)

Nonlocal
0.189
(0.00)
0.144
(0.03)
0.049
(0.57)

LocalNonlocal
-0.040
(0.00)
-0.041
(0.00)
-0.032
(0.00)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2007 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.111
(0.01)
-0.141
(0.00)
-0.119
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.100
(0.02)
-0.128
(0.00)
-0.100
(0.01)

LocalNonlocal
-0.011
(0.08)
-0.013
(0.12)
-0.019
(0.09)

Panel C: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms unconnected to HSR
lines from 2003 to 2015

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.065
(0.18)
-0.104
(0.04)
-0.116
(0.02)

Nonlocal
-0.043
(0.48)
-0.079
(0.18)
-0.086
(0.13)
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LocalNonlocal
-0.023
(0.00)
-0.026
(0.01)
-0.029
(0.03)

Figure 2: Sentiment coefficients over time before and after HSR reform
The figure shows the difference in the sentiment coefficients from Equation (4) between
local and nonlocal firms over the 24-month period for the treatment group and the
control group before and after the HSR reform. Dif_beta_Unconnected (dotted line) is
the difference in the sentiment coefficients between local and nonlocal firms that are
not connected to an HSR line over the 24-month period and Dif_beta_Connected is the
difference between those that are connected to HSR lines over the 24-month period.
Panel A shows the difference in sentiment coefficients between the treatment and
control groups from 2003 to 2006; Panel B shows the difference in sentiment
coefficients between the treatment and control groups from 2007 to 2015.
Panel A: Sentiment coefficients before the HSR reform, 2003-2006
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Panel B: Sentiment coefficients after the HSR reform, 2007-2015
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Table 11: Travel time and the investor sentiment effect
This table summarizes the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment
index (SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the
inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which
are shown in Equation (4). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on the travel times by train, plane and toll road. For Panel A, Local
represents the average stock returns on firms headquartered in cities within a 12-hour
travel time of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen while Nonlocal represents the returns on
firms headquartered in cities more than 12-hours away from Beijing, Shanghai or
Shenzhen. For Panel B, Local represents the average stock returns on firms
headquartered in cities within a 4-hour travel time of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen
while Nonlocal represents the returns on firms headquartered in cities more than 12hours away from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen. Local–Nonlocal represents the
difference in the average stock returns between local and nonlocal firms. Simulated pvalues are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the hypothesis that the
slope coefficient β does not equal 0.

Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 12 hours as localnonlocal boundary

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.155
(0.00)
-0.242
(0.00)
-0.260
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.140
(0.01)
-0.226
(0.00)
-0.241
(0.00)

LocalNonlocal
-0.014
(0.00)
-0.016
(0.00)
-0.019
(0.00)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on local and nonlocal firms with 4 hours as local
group and 12 hours as nonlocal group

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

Local
-0.156
(0.00)
-0.242
(0.00)
-0.260
(0.00)

Nonlocal
-0.140
(0.01)
-0.226
(0.00)
-0.241
(0.00)
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LocalNonlocal
-0.015
(0.00)
-0.016
(0.01)
-0.019
(0.05)

Table 12: Stock market participation and the investor sentiment effect
This table presents the results of the effect of the stock market participation rate on the
investor sentiment effect. Panel A summarizes the top three provinces in terms of stock
market participation rates from 2003 to 2014. Panel B summarizes the regressions of
portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index (SENT), the market earnings-toprice ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation rate (INFL) and the three Fama–
French factors (MKT, SMB and HML), which are shown in Equation (4). I report the
coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted portfolio formed on the stock market
participation rate. High represents the average stock returns on firms headquartered in
provinces with a top three stock market participation rate while Low represents the
returns on firms headquartered in other provinces. High–Low represents the differences
in the average stock returns between high and low stock market participation firms.
Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and are for two-sided tests of the
hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.
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Panel A: Top three stock market participation provinces

2003
Province
Shanghai
Beijing
Tianjin

2004
MPR
Province
45.01% Shanghai
23.08% Beijing
15.12% Tianjin

2005
MPR
Province
46.83% Shanghai
24.15% Beijing
15.20% Tianjin

2006
MPR
Province
43.79% Shanghai
24.69% Beijing
15.09% Tianjin

2007
Province
Shanghai
Beijing
Guangdong

2008
MPR
Province
68.44% Shanghai
34.86% Beijing
18.82% Guangdong

2009
MPR
Province
73.53% Shanghai
38.01% Beijing
20.66% Guangdong

2010
MPR
Province
80.90% Shanghai
45.01% Beijing
23.43% Guangdong

MPR
74.06%
46.77%
23.85%

2011
Province
Shanghai
Beijing
Guangdong

2012
MPR
Province
75.08% Shanghai
48.22% Beijing
25.40% Guangdong

2013
MPR
Province
75.04% Shanghai
48.22% Beijing
25.93% Guangdong

2014
MPR
Province
74.95% Shanghai
48.33% Beijing
26.46% Guangdong

MPR
78.03%
49.62%
27.57%

MPR
44.31%
20.87%
14.01%

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high market participate portfolios and low market
participate portfolios

Horizon
9 months
12 months
15 months

High
-0.073
(0.13)
-0.115
(0.03)
-0.127
(0.01)

Low
-0.054
(0.3)
-0.091
(0.09)
-0.101
(0.06)
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High-Low
-0.019
(0.00)
-0.023
(0.00)
-0.027
(0.00)

Table 13: Summary statistics on stock recommendations
This table presents the summary statistics on the number of analysts’ stock
recommendations from 2003 to 2015. Panel A reports the univariate analysis in terms
of the quarterly number of recommendations on local and nonlocal firms (250 miles as
the geographical cutting boundary). Panel B summarizes the yearly number of stock
recommendations.
Panel A: The number of analysts for local and nonlocal firms
Variables

Obs

Mean

Number of analysts for local firms

46,238

2.128

Number of analysts for nonlocal firms

35,500

1.905

Local-nonlocal

0.223***

t-statistic

8.61

Panel B: The number of stock recommendations by year
Year
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
2014
2015

Strongbuy
303
523
2062
4664
7108
15921
15773
30448
40009
33131
33810
36882
37521

Buy
641
1546
5710
8795
10804
31751
38297
46610
55712
48906
46133
40347
28671

Hold or worse
1011
1006
4291
3160
2343
11694
12900
8688
7940
7688
5710
3932
2251

All
1955
3075
12063
16619
20255
59366
66970
85746
103661
89725
85653
81161
68443

Total

258155

363923

72614

694692
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Table 14: Number of analyst recommendations and the investor sentiment effect
This table presents the full results on the relation between the number of analyst
recommendations and investor sentiment. Panel A presents the summary statistics for
the variables in the analysis. “Strong buy” is the number of quarterly “Strong buy”
recommendations, “Buy” is the number of quarterly “Buy” recommendations, “Hold or
worse” is the sum of quarterly “Netural”, “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations, and “All”
is the total stock recommendations issued in the corresponding quarter. SENT is the
average monthly investor sentiment index in a quarter. Local is a dummy variable that
equals 1 if the firm is identified as a local firm and 0 otherwise. GDPCHG is the
seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in a quarter, PASTMARKET is the gross
returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months prior to the beginning
of a quarter and MARKETVOL is the volatility of gross market returns during the 12
months prior to the beginning of a quarter. Size is the natural logarithm of a firm’s asset
value. BTM is the book-to-market ratio. RET is a firm’s gross market returns over the
past 12 months and RETVOL stands for the standard deviation in each firm’s monthly
returns over the past 12 months. CAPEX is the lagged capital expenditure as a
percentage of total assets and ROA is the lagged return on assets. LOSS equals 1 for
firms that report a loss in any of the previous four quarters and 0 otherwise. ISSUE
equals 1 if the firm issues equity in that quarter and 0 otherwise. Coverage is the number
of analysts following a firm in a certain quarter. IOHLD is the institutional ownership.
Panel B reports the regression results for the baseline model in Equation (5). Panel C
reports the probit regression result for the first-stage of the Heckman two-stage
procedure. Panel D reports the regression result for Equation (7). Panel E presents the
reaction of stock prices to different types of stock recommendations on local and
nonlocal firms, respectively.
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Panel A: Summary statistics
Variable
Strongbuy
Buy
Holdorworse
Coverage
IOHLD
BTM
ROA
CAPEX
RETVOL
RET
Size
ISSUE
LOSS
PASTMARKET
MARKETVOL
GDPCHG
SENT
Local
Local*SENT

N
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738
81738

mean
3.16
4.45
0.89
2.03
2.28
0.98
0.02
0.06
0.12
0.21
21.98
0.01
0.25
0.13
0.07
0.03
-0.02
0.57
-0.01

sd
8.46
9.17
2.80
3.67
4.91
0.84
0.04
0.06
0.06
0.54
1.04
0.08
0.43
0.41
0.03
0.01
0.88
0.50
0.66

p25
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.43
0.00
0.02
0.08
-0.16
21.26
0.00
0.00
-0.11
0.05
0.02
-0.68
0.00
-0.22

p50
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.00
0.01
0.72
0.02
0.04
0.11
0.08
21.87
0.00
0.00
0.03
0.06
0.03
-0.16
1.00
0.00

p75
3.00
4.00
0.00
2.00
1.98
1.24
0.04
0.09
0.15
0.51
22.60
0.00
0.00
0.38
0.08
0.04
0.38
1.00
0.00

Panel B: Regressions analysis for number of stock recommendations and investor
sentiment
VARIABLES

Strongbuy

Buy

Holdorworse

SENT

-0.040
(-0.59)
40.930***
(7.17)
0.114**
(2.45)
0.751***
(15.31)
10.400***
(13.11)
1.135***
(2.65)
3.137***
(43.52)

-0.074
(-1.02)
26.976***
(6.98)
-0.053
(-1.07)
0.418***
(9.36)
13.624***
(16.27)
2.173***
(4.64)
3.191***
(49.08)

-0.016
(-0.57)
0.061
(0.06)
-0.022
(-1.07)
-0.042**
(-2.32)
-0.323
(-1.10)
0.811***
(4.42)
0.446***
(20.20)

Local
Local*SENT
BTM
ROA
CAPEX
Size
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IOHLD
RETVOL
RET
ISSUE
LOSS
PASTMARKET
MARKETVOL
GDPCHG

0.269***
(27.83)
0.095
(0.20)
0.729***
(9.00)
0.701*
(1.90)
0.084
(1.64)
-1.469***
(-8.68)
-8.915***
(-4.13)
12.276***
(4.50)

0.253***
(26.17)
1.665***
(3.18)
0.001
(0.01)
0.589*
(1.72)
0.018
(0.32)
-0.923***
(-5.01)
-17.290***
(-7.26)
16.407***
(5.05)

-0.032***
(-11.41)
1.259***
(5.67)
-0.477***
(-13.92)
0.081
(0.79)
-0.081***
(-3.28)
-0.023
(-0.32)
0.538
(0.65)
-4.084***
(-3.04)

81,738
0.507
YES
YES
0.494

81,738
0.280
YES
YES
0.261

Observations
81,738
R-squared
0.474
Year FE
YES
Firm FE
YES
Adjusted R-squared
0.460
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Panel C: Heckman two-stage regression (Stage one)
VARIABLES
NUM
SENT
Local
Local*SENT
BTM
ROA
CAPEX

treated
0.001***
(7.02)
0.072***
(5.30)
0.051***
(4.87)
0.007
(0.57)
0.145***
(21.81)
6.374***
(32.13)
2.518***
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Size
IOHLD
RETVOL
RET
ISSUE
LOSS
PASTMARKET
MARKETVOL
GDPCHG

(29.15)
0.603***
(83.97)
0.098***
(39.77)
-1.209***
(-10.84)
0.305***
(17.07)
0.126*
(1.81)
-0.233***
(-16.81)
-0.586***
(-21.34)
2.469***
(9.65)
-5.499***
(-14.40)

Observations
81,738
Pseudo R2
0.308
Robust z-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Panel D: Heckman two-stage regression (Stage two)
VARIABLES

Strongbuy

Buy

Holdorworse

SENT

0.438***
(6.49)
37.253***
(6.98)
0.097**
(2.11)
1.741***
(30.03)
57.392***
(34.92)
19.608***
(28.62)
7.067***

0.259***
(3.55)
24.410***
(6.61)
-0.065
(-1.32)
1.109***
(21.58)
46.421***
(29.83)
15.066***
(22.30)
5.933***

-0.035
(-1.25)
0.208
(0.22)
-0.021
(-1.04)
-0.082***
(-4.23)
-2.209***
(-4.31)
0.070
(0.28)
0.289***

Local
Local*SENT
BTM
ROA
CAPEX
Size
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IOHLD
RETVOL
RET
ISSUE
LOSS
PASTMARKET
MARKETVOL
GDPCHG
invmills1

(49.16)
0.601***
(39.39)
-9.426***
(-17.19)
3.211***
(29.62)
1.715***
(4.75)
-2.252***
(-29.69)
-5.314***
(-25.97)
11.158***
(5.07)
-27.105***
(-9.29)
11.423***
(36.45)

Observations
81,738
R-squared
0.504
Firm FE
YES
Firm FE
YES
Adjusted R-squared
0.491
Robust t-statistics in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

(48.24)
0.485***
(35.05)
-4.980***
(-8.57)
1.733***
(15.95)
1.296***
(3.79)
-1.612***
(-21.55)
-3.606***
(-17.21)
-3.280
(-1.35)
-11.079***
(-3.27)
7.973***
(29.29)
81,738
0.520
YES
YES
0.507

(7.39)
-0.045***
(-11.12)
1.641***
(6.85)
-0.576***
(-14.24)
0.041
(0.39)
0.013
(0.41)
0.131*
(1.66)
-0.268
(-0.31)
-2.504*
(-1.78)
-0.458***
(-5.32)
81,738
0.281
YES
YES
0.262

Panel E: Market reaction to different types of stock recommendations

Variables
No. of Obs.
Strongbuy
52,326
Buy
70,770
Holdorworse
18,013
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1

Local
1.73%***
1.07%***
-0.18%***
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Nonlocal
1.49%***
0.92%***
-0.31%***

Difference
0.24%***
0.14%***
0.13%***

Table 15. A comparison of institutional ownership
This table compares the quarterly institutional ownership between firms. Specifically,
Panel A reports the comparison of institutional ownership between local and nonlocal
firms; Panel B summarizes the comparison of institutional ownership between firms
with above- and below-sample median sentiment index and between local and nonlocal
firms. 250 miles27 is the geographic cutting boundary for local and nonlocal firms.
Panel A: Comparison of institutional holding on local and nonlocal firms
Geography
Local

2.33

Nonlocal

2.32
0.40[0.69]

Panel B: Comparison of institutional holding on local and nonlocal firms, highsentiment and low-sentiment period.

Geography\Sentiment
Local
Nonlocal
Diagonal test:
13.71***[0.00]

27

Sent<=Sample
Median
2.00

Sent>Sample
Median
2.66

1.95

2.70

Column test:
0.98[0.33]

Column test:
0.60[0.55]

The results are robust when I use 100 miles, 100 kilometers as geographic cutting boundary.
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t_Value[p_value]
Row test:
13.96***[0.00]
Row test:
13.15***[0.00]
Diagonal test:
13.38***[0.00]

Table 16: Gross domestic product and investor sentiment effect
This table reports the results for the effect of GDP on the investor sentiment effect.
Panel A presents the regressions of portfolio returns from t to t+k on the sentiment index
(SENT), the market earnings-to-price ratio (EP), the risk-free rate (RF), the inflation
rate (INFL) and the three Fama–French factors (MKT, SMB and HML) which are
shown in Equation (4). I report the coefficient on SENT for each equal-weighted
portfolio formed on the nominal value of GDP at the province level. High refers to the
average stock returns on firms headquartered in provinces with top ten GDP while Low
refers to the returns on firms headquartered in other provinces. High–Low represents
the differences in the average stock returns between high GDP and low GDP firms.
Panel B shows the same regression results as Panel A but without firms located in
Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong. Simulated p-values are reported in parentheses and
are for two-sided tests for the hypothesis that the slope coefficient β does not equal 0.

Panel A: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high GDP portfolios and low GDP portfolios

Horizons
9 months
12 months
15 months

High
-0.059
(0.23)
-0.097
(0.06)
-0.108
(0.03)

Low
-0.061
(0.25)
-0.100
(0.07)
-0.109
(0.04)

High-Low
0.002
(0.64)
0.002
(0.55)
0.001
(0.65)

Panel B: Equal-weighted portfolio regression on high GDP portfolios and low GDP portfolios (after
excluding firms located in Beijing, Shanghai or Guangdong)

Horizons
9 months
12 months
15 months

High
-0.054
(0.28)
-0.090
(0.08)
-0.100
(0.05)

Low
-0.056
(0.29)
-0.093
(0.1)
-0.099
(0.06)
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High-Low
0.003
(0.57)
0.003
(0.58)
0.000
(0.81)
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Appendix: Variable Definitions
Variable

Definition

CEFD

The value-weighted average difference between the net asset value (NAV) per share and market price of each closed-end fund share, divided by the net asset value (NAV) per share

TURN

The natural log of the ratio of the amount of monthly market turnover trading to the aggregate market value, detrended by the 5-month moving average

NIPO

The number of monthly initial public offerings

RIPO

The average market-adjusted first-day returns of initial public offerings

Eshare

The ratio of equity issues to total equity issues and bank borrowing.

DSG

The growth rate of savings deposits controlling for the growth of money supply (M0)

NACT

The natural log number of new investment accounts (in thousands)

IPG

The growth in industrial production

CG

The consumption growth rate

sentiment

The sentiment index

EP

The market level earnings-to-price ratio

RF

The risk-free rate, measured by the monthly interest rate on one-year fixed deposits

INFL

The monthly inflation rate

ExRET

The excess return on the market portfolio of stocks

SMB

The difference between average returns on the small-stock portfolio and average returns on the large-stock portfolio per month

HML

The difference between average returns on the high-BE/ME portfolio and average returns on the low-BE/ME portfolio per month

cr_eq_f`i'

The i-month future market return

Local

The average returns of firms located within certain radius (250miles, 100miles or 100kilometers) of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 5 to Table 10 and in Table 15

Local

The average returns on firms headquartered in cities with less travel times from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 11

Local

A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm is identified as a local firm and 0 otherwise in Table 14

Nonlocal

The average returns of firms located outside certain radius (250miles, 100miles or 100kilometers) of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 5 to Table 10 and in Table 15

Nonlocal

The average returns on firms headquartered in cities with more travel times from Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen in Table 11

D1

The average returns of firms located within a 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen
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D2

The average returns of firms located between 100-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai or Shenzhen and 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen

D3

The average returns of firms located outside a 1,000-kilometer radius of Beijing, Shanghai and Shenzhen

High

The average returns on firms located in provinces with top three stock market participation rate/top ten GDP

Low

The average returns on firms located in provinces with low (lower than top three) stock market participation rate/ low GDP ( lower than top ten)

MPR

The provincial-level total stock accounts divided by the year-end population in that province

Strongbuy

The number of quarterly “Strong buy” recommendations

Buy

The number of quarterly “Buy” recommendations

Holdorworse

The sum of quarterly “Netural”, “Hold” and “Sell” recommendations

Coverage

The number of analysts following a firm in a quarter

IOHLD

The institutional ownership in a quarter

BTM

The book-to-market ratio

ROA

The lagged return on assets

CAPEX

The lagged capital expenditure as a percentage of total assets

RETVOL

The standard deviation in each firm’s monthly returns over the past 12 months

RET

A firm’s gross market returns over the past 12 months

Size

The natural logarithm of a firm’s asset value

ISSUE

A dummy variable that equals 1 if the firm issues equity in that quarter and 0 otherwise

LOSS

A dummy variable that equals 1 for firms that report a loss in any of the previous four quarters and 0 otherwise

PASTMARKET

The gross returns on the value-weighted market index over the 12 months prior to the beginning of a quarter

MARKETVOL

The volatility of gross market returns during the 12 months prior to the beginning of a quarter

GDPCHG

The seasonally adjusted percentage change in GDP in a quarter

SENT

The average monthly investor sentiment index in a quarter
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